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ABSTRACT
Scott, Irana. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2012. Accounting and
auditing enforcement releases: Cash flow evidence associated with revenue recognition
fraud. Major Professor: Carolyn M. Callahan.
In an attempt to predict financial statement fraud, prior accounting research has
considered the characteristics of firms that manipulate their financial statements. The
aforementioned studies have included various fraud types and often focus on accruals
manipulations of the financial statements. In contrast, this study concentrates on a
specific type of fraud, revenue manipulations, and the effect of this fraud type on the
firm’s cash flows. This is an important issue as fraud (and related cash flow) is directly
related to the firm’s ability to remain viable. This three-paper dissertation contributes to
existing literature by separating revenue manipulations from other types of fraud and
looking at cash flows instead of accruals as an indicator of the fraud.
The first paper investigates cash flows to see if they are abnormally low during
the period when firms are fraudulently increasing revenues. The second paper examines
whether management will decrease discretionary expenditures in order to increase the
abnormally low cash flows and hide the manipulation. Asset sales are explored in the
third paper. Management may sell assets when manipulating revenues since cash flows
are low and external financing is harder to obtain.
Results indicate that cash flows are abnormally low during a period of revenue
manipulation, but discretionary expenditures are not decreased to hide the manipulation.
In addition, asset sales are more likely when firms manipulate revenues. Taken together,
this research suggests that revenue manipulation and cash flow analysis is important in
the early detection of fraud, governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
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results of this study can benefit auditors, investors, regulators, and creditors as they
examine the quality of revenue recognition practices by management. The results could
also support discussion of the value of the cash flow statement in predicting financial
statement fraud. Accountants are currently debating the validity of the appropriate
financial statements that best represents the firm’s future operational viability.
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PREFACE
The three separate and distinct studies that comprise this dissertation study
consider the effect of fraudulent revenue manipulations on operating cash flows. Prior
studies have generally focused on accruals manipulations as a means of committing
fraud. Also, research that focuses on only one account, such as revenues, is sparse.
Consequently, this study contributes to the understanding of fraudulently manipulated
financial statements by providing information about the relationship between revenue
manipulations and cash flows. The research also considers whether managers will take
actions to increase cash flows through the management of discretionary expenditures and
asset sales. As of the time of the completion of this dissertation, none of these three
studies have been submitted to journals for publication.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Each year management’s fraudulent manipulation of financial statements results
in billions of dollars of losses for investors, auditors, creditors, and employees. Market
losses decrease the value of an investor’s portfolio; managers are fired or forced to retire;
firms and auditors may be sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC); auditors may be censored by the SEC; firms and their auditors may be sued by
shareholders; auditors may suffer reputational capital; and firms may be unable to meet
credit obligations.
Given that the costs of manipulated financial statements are significant and affect
many different stakeholders, a considerable amount of research has been devoted to
understanding the characteristics of firms that commit fraud. The samples used in this
research have included different types of fraud, and the research has often concentrated
on accruals management. Less research has investigated the characteristics of firms that
commit fraud through a specific account such as revenues. Revenue manipulation is the
most common form of financial statement fraud even though the costs are higher when a
firm manipulates revenues. The characteristics of firms that manipulate revenues may be
different from firms that commit fraud in other ways. Understanding these unique
characteristics could help stakeholders recognize firms that may be manipulating
revenues thus reducing their risks and possible losses. This dissertation, which consists of
three papers, investigates firms that specifically manipulate revenues and indicators that
may lead to the discovery that the manipulation.
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The first paper examines the relationship between manipulated revenues and cash
flows from operations. Cash flows from operations may not increase when revenues are
increased by entries that do not meet the guidelines for revenue recognition. Cash flows
from operations will then be abnormally low as compared to revenues. The sample for
this study consists of firms that have received an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release (AAER) issued by the SEC for fraudulent revenue manipulation along with a
matched control sample of firms that have not received an AAER. Normal and abnormal
cash flows are calculated based on sales and the change in the sales from the prior year.
Empirical results show that cash flows are abnormally low for the firms that received an
AAER during the manipulation period, but they are not abnormally low during the period
before or after the manipulation.
Using the same sample as the first paper, the second paper investigates whether
discretionary expenditures will be abnormally low when firms manipulate revenues.
Since cash flows from operations are abnormally low for these firms, as shown in paper
one, management will be motivated to increase cash flows to hide the fraud. Decreasing
discretionary expenditures would produce this needed increase in cash from operations,
and discretionary expenditures would be abnormally low. Normal and abnormal levels of
discretionary expenditures are calculated based on sales and the change in sales from the
prior period. Even though prior research has shown that management uses discretionary
expenditures to manage financial statement accounts (Roychowdhury 2006), empirical
results for the current research does not show that management decreases discretionary
expenditures to abnormally low levels to hide the manipulation of revenues. An alternate
theory, hypothesized by Anderson et al. 2002, which states that discretionary costs are
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“sticky” and difficult to decrease in the short-term may explain the results and can be
investigated in future research.
The third paper explores whether firms will divert attention away from revenue
manipulations by selling assets. Prior research has shown that management will make
unexpected asset sales when certain events occur (Lang et al. 1995). Firms may sell
assets to pay down debt, to meet loan covenants, or to improve poor performance. Firms
that manipulate revenues may be having performance or credit problem, and management
would be motivated to sell assets. The results of the research indicate that the
manipulation of revenues significantly increases the likelihood that firms will make
unexpected, significant asset sales.
Together these three papers indicate that an analysis of cash flow from operations
as well as from investments can lead to an early detection of revenue manipulations.
Prior research has looked at different types of fraud when investigating characteristics of
firms that commit financial statement fraud and has concentrated on accruals
manipulation. The current study contributes to current literature by separating revenue
manipulations from other types of fraud and looking at cash flows instead of accruals as
an indicator of fraud. The results could begin discussions on the importance of the cash
flow statement in detecting financial statement fraud.
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CHAPTER 2
CASH FLOW EFFECTS OF REVENUE MANIPULATIONS
Abstract
This study investigates firms that fraudulently manipulate their financial statements
through revenue manipulations. The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, the paper is a
study of revenue manipulators specifically. Previous research into financial statement fraud has
focused on different types of fraud in their samples. Using a sample of revenue manipulators
only is important since revenue manipulations are the most prevalent and costly type of
accounting manipulations. Looking at revenue manipulations as opposed to other types of
manipulations is important since different indicators can be developed to more precisely reveal
specific types of fraud.

Second, previous fraud research has not examined an association

between cash flows from operations and earnings management through financial statement
manipulations. While earnings management has received substantial attention, cash flow
research has received less attention.
Specifically, this study examines whether cash flows from operations taken from the cash
flow statement are abnormally low during the periods when the financial statements are
manipulated. Using logistic regression models, three hypotheses are tested. The empirical
results reveal that for firms that manipulate their financial statements, cash flows from operations
are abnormally low during the manipulation period, but they are not abnormally low before or
after the manipulation. This indicates that a decrease in cash flows from operations to levels that
are abnormally low can be an indicator of financial statements that have been manipulated
through the recording of fraudulent revenue transactions.
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The results of this study add to previous fraud research and may lead to future research to
discover other characteristics that indicate manipulated revenues in financial statements.
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Introduction
A 2002 GAO study found that firm revenue manipulations caused a market loss of $56
billion from January 1997 through June 2002 (GAO 2002). This sizeable loss indicates the
importance of research to determine factors that might help auditors, investors, and regulators
predict revenue manipulations. The objective of this study is to investigate whether abnormally
low cash flows can be used to detect fraudulent revenue recognition practices. The question to
be answered is whether operating cash flows will be abnormally low, in relation to revenues,
when firms have reported revenues that do not follow GAAP guidelines for revenue reporting.
GAAP and SEC regulations require that certain criteria must be met for revenue to be
recognized. There must be persuasive evidence that a sales arrangement exists; delivery must
have occurred or services must have been rendered; the seller’s price to the buyer must be fixed
or determinable; and collectability must be reasonably assured.
Managers have developed a variety of tactics to manipulate revenues and circumvent
these regulations. A few popular methods are channel stuffing, round-tripping, undisclosed side
agreements, or fraudulent bill and hold transactions. Channel stuffing involves increasing current
sales by forcing products into a firm’s distribution channel prematurely with no expectation that
it will be sold. Bristol-Myers used channel stuffing to orchestrate an alleged $2.5 billion fraud
by offering incentives to wholesalers to build up their inventories so that Bristol-Myers could
meet sales forecasts. In round-tripping, a company will agree to make offsetting purchases with
another company. Side agreements give customers the opportunity to cancel sales contracts, but
the revenue is recognized when the initial contract is made. Computer Associates recognized
fraudulent revenue of $2.2 billion by agreeing to make offsetting purchases (round tripping).
They also made contracts with customers that included undisclosed side letters that could have
canceled the contracts. In bill and hold arrangements, companies may record sales prematurely
6

before the customer takes title to the product or before the product is shipped. Companies might
also record fictitious revenue by creating false invoices or by recording sales from expired
contracts. MiniScribe Corporation, a manufacturer of hard drives, used bill and hold
arrangements and false invoicing in a much publicized case of revenue manipulation. In 1987,
the company increased its sales by 95 percent in one year by booking sales that were sent to its
own warehouse instead of when they were shipped to customers. Because of this manipulation,
MiniScribe was named as one of the top growth companies in the electronics industry, prompting
investors to invest in this rapidly growing company. Maintaining this level of growth became
difficult, especially since it was based on fraudulently recorded revenues. In order to maintain its
growth level and stock value, MiniScribe developed other fraudulent methods. The company
packaged bricks as finished products and shipped them to distributors at the end of the year.
Auditors, regulators, creditors, and investors failed to recognize this fraudulent activity.
Failure to recognize fraudulent revenue manipulations can be very costly to the firm and
to stakeholders. These costs include litigation, restatements, unfavorable audit reports, increased
audit fees, negative market reactions, and investigations and sanctions by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Feroz et al. (1991) found serious consequences for firms that
were formally investigated by the SEC for fraudulent activities. They found that 72% of the
enforcement targets fired or forced the resignation of top managers; 42% of the firm auditors
were censured by the SEC; and 81% of the firms were sued by shareholders. Auditors are often
included in these lawsuits and suffer monetary losses as well as a decrease in reputational capital.
Louwers et al. (2008) reports that in the case of MiniScribe, stock prices fell from $15 to $1 in
1989. The CEO, two corporate controllers, and 13 other corporate officers were charged with
falsifying financial records. The auditor, Coopers & Lybrand, paid a $140 million settlement to
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defrauded shareholders. These high costs could have been avoided if the fraudulent activities
had been detected.
In order to gain insight into ways to recognize fraudulent manipulation, previous
literature has examined firms that manipulated their financial statements. These studies have
focused on financial statement fraud in general and not a particular type of manipulation. The
current study contributes to this research stream by focusing on revenue manipulations and a
possible indicator of this manipulation, cash flows from operations as reported in the cash flow
statement.
The cash flow statement has often been considered one of the “cleaner” financial
statements since cash is viewed as less subject to manipulation than earnings reported on the
income statement. As stated in their textbook on financial statement analysis, Subramayam and
Wild (2009) state that, “Accounting accruals determining net income rely on estimates, deferrals,
allocations, and valuation. These considerations sometimes allow more subjectivity than do the
factors determining cash flows. For this reason we often relate cash flows from operations to net
income in assessing its quality. Some users consider earnings of higher quality when the ratio of
cash flows from operations divided by net income is greater. This derives from a concern with
revenue recognition or expense accrual criteria yielding high net income but low cash flows.
Cash flows from operations effectively serve as a check on net income, but not as a substitute for
net income”. (p. 412)
Cash flows from operations may be an effective test of the quality of net income and
accruals. Accruals include subjective decisions that managers make concerning the expenses
used to derive net income. Can it also be used to test the quality of revenue recognition practices
and the value of reported revenues? The expectation is that cash flows from operations would
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increase as revenues increase but certain revenue manipulations may be only a matter of
“timing” differences. Firms may recognize income a few days early, which puts the income in
one year as opposed to the next year, but the payment will come in at approximately the same
time. This may be true in a bill and hold arrangement. Manipulating revenues by “roundtripping” also would not affect cash flows since firms are exchanging sales and money with
customers. Firms also use fraudulent bartering transactions to increase revenues. This involves
the exchange of goods or services and does not affect cash flows.
These are examples of revenue manipulations that will not affect cash flows. Cash flows
from operations can be used as a check of the quality of subjective accruals and management
reporting decisions, but can it be used as an indicator of fraudulent revenue manipulations? This
study attempts to provide insight into that question. The results indicate a positive association
between abnormally low cash flows and manipulated revenues and are summarized as follows.
In the logistic regression for the full sample of manipulating firms and control firms,
firms that manipulate revenues report significantly lower cash flows than firms that do not
manipulate revenues. The full sample includes observations for the manipulating firms and
control firms during the manipulation period as well as a two-year period before the
manipulation period (when available) and the two-year period after the manipulation period
(when available).
To further investigate the relationship between revenue manipulation and cash flows
from operations, the full sample is divided by time period – the period before the manipulation,
the manipulation period, and the period after the manipulation. Results reveal that cash flows are
significantly lower for revenue manipulating firms during the manipulation period, but are not
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significantly lower for these firms before the manipulation period or after the manipulation
period.
Since firms might manipulate revenues for more than one period, the sample of firms that
are included during the manipulation period is further divided by the first year of the
manipulation and the years subsequent to the manipulation. The results show that cash flows are
abnormally low for each year of the manipulation period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
background of SEC Enforcement Actions. The third section includes prior research and the
fourth section develops the hypotheses. The fifth section describes the methodology. The sixth
section reports and discusses the empirical results. The final section provides the summary and
concluding remarks.
Background of SEC Enforcement Actions
Firms that have been issued an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER)
by the SEC are used as the sample for this study. SEC enforcement actions are taken against
firms that are identified as having violated the financial reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC obtains leads for investigation from several sources: (1) public
complaints and tips; (2) the reporting requirements of federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies under the Bank Secrecy Act; (3) the enforcement staff of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board; (4) the enforcement of “blue sky laws” by state securities
regulators; (5) complaints and other information from members of Congress on behalf of
constituents whom they represent;(6) trading related referrals from domestic self-regulatory
organizations (SROS); (7) and their own examinations of financial statements (SEC 2010(b)).
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SEC staff members from the Division of Corporation Finance examine financial
statements and other filings for routine screening criteria violations and for suspicious subjective
factors. If a firm is suspected of fraudulent activity because of screening or because of a tip from
another source, the firm is investigated. When the initial investigation exposes factors that
warrant further investigation, an informal investigation is conducted, and persons with relevant
information are invited to provide pertinent documents and testimony. The SEC need not
formally notify the target firm during this investigation, thus protecting firms that will be cleared
by the informal investigation. If strong evidence of a securities law violation is uncovered
during the informal investigation, the SEC may pursue a formal investigation. The formal
investigation grants subpoena power to compel testimony and the production of documents. If
the SEC informs the target of the formal investigation, the 1934 Act Release No. 5092 requires
disclosure to shareholders by the firm, and the investigation may become public. The SEC
policy is to make its enforcement activities public only when it files a formal complaint alleging
securities law violations and seeks settlement with the enforcement target.
According to the SEC enforcement manual dated January 13, 2010 which includes
conforming revisions as of March 3, 2010, (SEC 2010b) the SEC ranks investigations and
allocates resources to them based on the listings and rankings of associate directors and regional
directors who list their top ten investigations and rank their top three investigations. These
rankings are based on three factors, the programmatic importance of an enforcement action; the
magnitude of potential violations; and the resources required to investigate the potential
violations. Feroz et al. (1991) point out that the SEC ranks a target according to the probability
of success since there are more targets for investigation than the SEC can practically pursue, and
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since the investigations are both costly and highly visible. Of the firms that were investigated
formally in 2009, 94% were resolved in favor of the SEC (SEC 2010a, p. 30).
Prior Research
Three research streams provide important background information for the current study;
(1) research using Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs); (2) research
concerning revenue manipulation; and (3) research concerning cash flows from operations.
AAER Research
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) have been used in previous
research to identify characteristics of firms that fraudulently manipulated their financial
statement. These studies do not look at revenue manipulating firms specifically but are important
to the current study since revenue manipulation is the most prevalent form of fraud.
Dechow et al. (1996) analyzed 436 AAERs released between April 1982 and December
1992 and had a final sample of 92 firms. The primary focus of the paper was on corporate
governance factors that were associated with financial statement manipulators. They found that
manipulating firms have a higher number of insiders on the board and a CEO who is more
powerful and entrenched. They also found some evidence that accruals appear to be high at the
time of manipulation. In their descriptive statistics, they found that the ratio of cash from
operations to assets was lower for their sample of fraud firms as compared to a control sample
even though the difference was only marginally significant.
Baneish (1997) analyzed 363 AAERs and included in his sample 49 firms that violated
GAAP. He added 15 firms that had been questioned by the news media between 1987 and 1993
and classified the entire sample as manipulators. By using the modified Jones model, he selected
a separate sample of firms that had high accruals that he termed “aggressive accruers”. The

12

objective of the study was to explain differences between the manipulators and firms that have
high accruals and appear to be applying GAAP aggressively. He found that the differences
between the groups were explained by accruals, day’s sales in receivables, and prior
performance.
Baneish (1999) matched the sample from the 1997 study to 2,332 Compustat nonmanipulators and calculated an index for seven financial statement ratios. An earnings
overstatement was indicated by a higher index value. Indexes for days’ sales in receivables,
gross margin, asset quality, sales growth, and accruals were found to be important in
distinguishing an earnings overstatement.
Etthredge et al. (2006) examined 169 AAERs which they matched to a control sample
based on firm size, industry, and whether the firm had reported a loss. They found that deferred
taxes, auditor change, market-to-book, revenue growth, and whether the firm was an OTC firm
could be used to predict manipulations.
Brazel et al. (2006) studied non-financial measures in a sample of 77 AAER firms and
found that growth rates between financial and non-financial variables were significantly different
for AAER firms. Skousen and Wright (2006) focused on governance variables and analyzed 86
manipulating firms matched by industry and sales. The found that the manipulating firms had
managers with higher stockholdings; had less effective audit committees; had more powerful
CEOs; and had recently changed auditors.
Dechow et al. (2011) created a database by examining 2,191 AAERs. The final sample
of their study included 680 firms that allegedly manipulated their quarterly or annual financial
statements. The purpose of their study was two-fold. First, they developed a comprehensive
database of firms that had received an AAER. By doing this they were able to use a much larger
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sample than previous studies. Second, they began research into developing characteristics of
manipulating firms. Based on their findings, they developed a model to help predict
manipulations. They found that most firms manipulate more than one account with revenues
being the account that was most often manipulated (55 percent). Manipulations are found most
often in industries that include computers and computer services, retail, and general services
firms. They also occur more frequently in large firms, but this could have been a result of using
AAERs. The SEC does formal investigations of more visible manipulators which may involve
large losses to numerous investors. The manipulating firms were strong performers before the
manipulation and may have been attempting to hide a moderating performance. Their stock
returns outperformed the market before the manipulation but underperformed after the
manipulation. During the time of the manipulation, cash profit margins and earnings growth
declined while accruals increased.
Revenue Manipulation Research
Revenue manipulations research has attempted to determine the type of firms that are
more likely to manipulate revenue. Management will manipulate revenues more often than
earnings in general if analysts find that revenues are more value relevant than earnings in
investing decisions. The Internet bubble brought renewed interest in the value relevance of
revenue since the stock of these firms had a high value that was not related to earnings. Trueman
et al. (2000) found that earnings are not related to the stock price of Internet firms, but measures
of revenues were value relevant. This is consistent with the life cycle theory of Porter (1980). If
firms are in the growth stage of development, they will have more incentives to manage revenues
if this will have an influence on market reaction. In order to value the firm, investors will use
revenues, which, as suggested by most valuation models, are less noisy and more persistent than
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expenses (Ertimur et al. 2003). Burgstalher and Dichev (1997) argue that certain firms may have
less risk of detection giving them an incentive to manipulate revenues. They hypothesize that
firms that have a high level of accounts receivable will find it less costly to manipulate revenues
through changes in accounts receivable since a percentage change in the account will be less
noticeable. Firms may also manipulate revenues if a sales forecast is made by analysts.
Executives believe that meeting benchmarks leads to credibility and higher stock prices (Graham
et al. 2005).
Cash Flow Research
The previously discussed AAER and revenue manipulation studies are a part of earnings
management research. This research stream focuses on accruals management and has been
extensively studied. Since cash flows are not affected by accruals management, earnings
management studies have not included studies of cash flows. The statement of cash flows is
considered a “cleaner” statement and less subject to manipulation than the income statement, so
fewer studies have been done in the cash flow area. The research that has been done focuses on
the use of cash in the management of operational activities, or real earnings management, which
is within the bounds of GAAP.
Early work in cash and operational activities focused on investment activities, such as
reductions of research and development expenditures. Bens et al. (2002, 2003) found that
managers repurchase stock to avoid EPS dilution arising from (a) employee stock option
exercises, and (b) employee stock option grants, and that they partially finance these repurchases
by reducing R&D. Dechow and Sloan (1991) found that CEOs reduce spending on R&D toward
the end of their tenure to increase short-term earnings. Baber et al. (1991) and Bushee (1998)
provided evidence that managers reduce R&D expenditures to meet earnings benchmarks.
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Roychowdury (2006) found evidence to suggest that managers reduce discretionary expenditures
to improve reported margins. This work has produced increased interest in this area of study.
Dechow et al. (2011) stated that Rochowdhury (2006) provided a needed preliminary step in the
direction of a useful area of future research that would “develop measures of earnings quality
that capture cash-based earnings manipulation (4).” Increased interest in cash flow research has
also been brought about by the growth in, and use of, cash flow forecasts by analysts.
Defond and Hung (2003) studied this increase in cash flow predictions in order to
develop an understanding of the characteristics common to firms that receive a cash flow
forecast. They found that firms that had large accruals, heterogeneous accounting choices, high
earnings volatility, high capital intensity, and poor financial health had a higher probability of
receiving a cash flow forecast since the forecast could be used to confirm earnings information.
Hypotheses Development
Firms that manipulate their financial statements have higher accruals than firms that do
not manipulate their financial statements (Dechow et al. 1996; Baneish 1997; Baneish 1999;
Dechow et al. 2011). When a firm records revenue that does not conform to GAAP
requirements, accruals will be increased but cash will not be realized. For example, a company
may record sales knowing that goods will never be shipped or that payment for the goods will
never be received. When this occurs, accounts receivable and sales will be increased, but the
future cash flows will not materialize. This also will lead to an increased number of days’ sales
in receivables, which was found to be a predictor of financial statement manipulations (Baneish
1997 and Baneish 1999). These firms may have a high level of receivables, so a percentage
change is less noticeable (Burgstalher and Dichev 1997), making it harder to recognize firm
manipulations. Manipulating firms have revenue growth (Etthredge et al. 2006), but declining
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cash profit margins (Dechow 2011). Concern over the quality of large accruals and the desire to
determine if these accruals actually lead to increased cash flows has led to cash flow forecasts
(Defond and Hung 2003).
As financial statement revenues increase, auditors and investors expect to see that firms
are generating significant amounts of cash through core operations. When revenues are
increased by manipulation, the fraudulently recorded revenues would not produce this increase in
operating cash flows. Accordingly, financial statements that include fraudulently recorded
revenues may include cash flows that are significantly lower than the cash flows from operations
found in the financial statements of firms that do not manipulate revenues, leading to the first
hypothesis stated in alternate form as follows:
H1: Cash flows from operations are abnormally low for firms that manipulate revenues
during the period of manipulation.
Research has provided information about manipulating firms, not only for the
manipulation period, but also for the periods before and after the manipulation period. These
firms have been found to be growth firms (Baneish 1999; Etthredge et al. 2006; Brazel et al.
2006) with strong financial performances (Baneish 1997; Dechow et al. 2011) that outperformed
the market (Dechow et al. 2011) in the periods before they began the manipulations, and
underperformed the market in the period after the manipulation (Dechow et al. 2011). These
firms have been scrutinized to determine the period of the manipulations. Knowing when the
manipulations began and ended provides an opportunity to determine if cash flows were within
normal ranges for these firms in the periods before and after they fraudulently recorded revenues.
The expectation is that cash flows will be within normal ranges during those time periods. This
leads to the second and third hypothesis stated in alternate form as follows.
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H2: Cash flows from operations will not be abnormally low for revenue manipulating
firms in the period before the manipulation.
H2: Cash flows from operations will not be abnormally low for revenue manipulating
firms in the period after the manipulation.
Methodology
Sample Selection
The sample for this study is selected from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC. There are alternative sources for identifying financial
statement manipulators such as the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database or the
Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits. The GAO database consists of a large number
of restatements, and a restatement is included even if the reason for the restatement is immaterial
and does not have economic significance. There also may not have been managerial intent to
commit a fraudulent act. The GAO database also only identifies the year that the restatement
was identified in the press. This would not provide information about the period of time that the
firm manipulated the financial statements. The Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits
reports shareholder lawsuits which may typically arise from material intentional manipulations,
but it also would include lawsuits that are brought for reasons that are unrelated to financial
manipulations. The sample for the current study must be made up of firms that have issued
financial statements that include GAAP violations (a) concerning revenue manipulations that are
economically significant and (b) were made with the intent of misleading investors. The SEC
only issues an AAER when there has been a significant financial statement manipulation and
management has the intent to commit fraud.
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Enforcement actions and investigations are brought by the SEC pursuant to Section 13(a)
of the Securities Act of 1934 in which the Commission alleges that the firm has overstated
earnings in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Under Section
13(a), firms whose securities are registered with the SEC must file reports that are required by
the SEC including quarterly and annual financial statements. These statements must comply
with Regulation S-X which requires conformity with GAAP.
The SEC investigates firms that may be in violation of SEC and federal rules, and they
may take action against firms, auditors, management, and other parties that are involved in the
violations. According to Dechow et al. (2011), the SEC checks for compliance with GAAP by
reviewing about one-third of the financial statements issued by public companies each year.
Dechow et al. (1996) identify other sources that may lead to an investigation including
anonymous tips from employees, insiders, journalists, and analysts, and voluntary restatements
by the firm itself. If they believe that there is an inconsistency with GAAP in the financial
statements, they can initiate an informal inquiry and gather additional information. The SEC
may drop the case after this informal investigation, or they may take further steps that may lead
to enforcement actions. This may include the issuance of an AAER as well as requiring the firm
to pay damages, restate financial statements, or change accounting methods.
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Manipulation period

Informal
Investigation

Enforcement Leads
Received by SEC

SEC Investigation Disclosed

Formal Investigation

Issuance of AAER

Figure 1
Timeline of SEC Investigation

The sample in the current study consists of firms that received an AAER for manipulating
annual financial statements and excludes those firms that manipulated quarterly earnings.
Management may be more concerned with manipulating revenues at year end to meet earnings
targets. Cash flows and revenues may also vary at the quarterly level due to seasonality in
business. Also excluded from the sample were firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between
4400 and 5000) and banks and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). This
follows prior research.
The sample was taken from two sources. The first source is a database developed by
Dechow et al. (2011) of firms that includes information from a review of AAERS from the SEC
website. The second source is provided by an examination of the individual AAERs issues by
the SEC.
Dechow et al. (2011) compiled a database of information from 2,191 AAERs issued by
the SEC from May 17th, 1982 through June 10th, 2005. This database includes three files: the
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Detail, Annual, and Quarterly files. The Detail file provides firm identifiers, a description of
why the AAER was issued, and the balance sheet and income statement accounts that are
affected. The Annual and Quarterly files are compiled from the Detail file and are formatted by
reporting period so the information can be matched to financial databases such as Compustat and
CRSP. This database includes all of the AAERS issued during a specific period of time, but the
current study is an investigation of only revenue manipulating firms. To obtain a sample of
firms that manipulate revenues, the database was sorted based on the reason for the AAER, the
accounts that were affected, and the year(s) of the manipulation. This database includes
information on AAERs beginning in 1982. The sample can only include firms that manipulated
revenues after 1986 since the study investigates the relationship between revenue manipulation
and operating cash flows. Data on operating cash flows is available on Compustat only after
1986. From the 2,191 AAERs included in the database, 307 individual firms were identified as
annual revenue manipulators after 1984.
The second source for the sample was the AAERs issued by the SEC. To extend the
sample, 913 individual AAERS were examined and appropriate information was hand collected.
In order to assure that information collected and decisions made during the collection process
were the same for this sample in comparison to the database from Dechow et al. (2011), a sample
of AAERs for 33 different firms that were included in the Dechow database were reviewed and
information collected. The information collected was identical to the information from the
Dechow database.
As the SEC investigates and sanctions firms, multiple AAERS may be issued for a single
firm, and action may be taken against various parties associated with the firm. Dechow et al.
(2011) report that of the 2,191 AAERs included in their database, “the SEC took action against
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2,592 different parties” (p. 15) including officers of the company, the firm itself, the auditor, the
attorney, and other parties such as consultants and investment bankers. Several AAERs may be
issued for the same firm with different information provided in each AAER. AAERs are not in a
standard format and the information provided will depend on who writes the AAER. The
information includes details about each case and the resultant sanctions and penalties that result
from the investigation. Conflicting information, such as the time period of the violation, may be
found in different AAERs. This information must be investigated to determine the correct data.
An examination of the Dechow database provided guidance about gathering the appropriate data.
AAERs are issued for a variety of different financial statement manipulations. For
example, major enforcement cases in 2009 included actions involving subprime-related
securities, actions involving auction rate securities, actions involving offering frauds/Ponzi
schemes, actions involving broker-dealers, actions involving mutual funds and investment
advisers, actions involving financial fraud and issuer disclosure, and actions involving insider
trading (SEC, 2010a). The focus of the current study is on those actions that involve financial
statement fraud through fraudulent revenue manipulation.
Following Dechow et al. (2011) each of the 913 AAERs from June 10th, 2005 through
January 19th, 2010 was separately examined to determine whether a GAAP violation involving
an annual revenue manipulation was involved. When a firm was identified as an annual revenue
manipulator, the reporting periods were identified. AAERs do not provide information about
company identifiers. These were retrieved from Compustat so that financial databases could be
used to collect variable information.
To be included in the sample, the AAER must allege that revenues have been
manipulated. Feroz et al. (1991) found that over 70% of the AAERs in their investigation
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consisted of overstatements of accounts receivable from premature revenue recognition and
overstatements of inventories from delayed write-offs. The income effects of these reporting
violations were more than 50% of reported income. In the sample used by Dechow et al. (1996),
40% overstated revenues, 7% delayed recognition of a loss, and 15.2% combined the
overstatement of revenues and the understatement of expenses.
For each of the firms in the sample, a control sample was obtained by the following
method used by Dechow et al. (1996).
1.

1

Determine the SEC firm’s total assets for the year-end prior to the first year of the
manipulation period.

2. Search the annual industrial and full coverage Compustat files for firms in the same
three-digit SIC industry that report assets in that year.
3. Select a control firm that minimized the absolute difference in assets. (9)
For the revenue manipulating sample and for the control sample, financial information
was taken from Compustat for the manipulation period and also for the two years before the
manipulation (when available) and two years after the manipulation (when available). This
additional time period provided an additional control sample.
Research Design
A logistic regression framework is used to model the probability that abnormally low
cash flows occur when revenues are manipulated. Logistic regression is used to predict the
probability of an event occurring. Using a dichotomous dependent variable, this study predicts
the probability of whether abnormally low cash flows occur with a set of chosen independent
variables. The dependent variable is expected to be nonlinear with one or more of the

1

An alternative method of obtaining a control sample would be to follow Kothari et al. (2005) who match
based on accruals.
23

independent variables. Probabilities lie between 0 and 1 with 0.5 as the value in which both
outcomes are equally likely. Prior research historically uses logistic models for qualitative
dependent variables.
The logistic regression model is used to estimate the coefficients and statistical
significance of each variable and is given below.
ABN_CF_IND =  +  ACCRMAG +  AFT_MAN +  BEF_MAN +
 CL +  HASDEBT +  INCOME +  INVREC +
 MANIPULATOR +  MFG +  MTB+  PREV_YR_CF_IND
+  SIZE + 
Where:
ABN_CF_IND
ACCRMAG

=
=

AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN

=
=

CL

=

Current liabilities at the beginning of the year scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year

HASDEBT

=

INCOME

=

INVREC

=

Has long-term or short-term debt outstanding at the beginning of
of the year or at the end of the year (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year
The sum of the beginning of the year inventories and receivables
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year
Received an AAER for revenue manipulation(1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Firm belongs to manufacturing industry (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
The ratio of MVE to BVE
Abnormally low cash flow in the previous year
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Natural log of MVE
Error term

MANIPULATOR
=
MFG
=
MTB
=
PREV_YR_CF_IND =
SIZE





=


Abnormally low cash flows (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Absolute value of net income before extraordinary items
minus operating cash flows divided by total assets.
Time period is after the manipulation period (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Time period is before the manipulation period(1 if yes, 0
otherwise)

The dependent variable is the presence of abnormally low cash flows. ABN_CF_IND is
coded 1 if a firm has abnormally low cash flows, 0 otherwise. The methodology developed by
Dechow et al. (1998) is used to determine normal cash flows coefficients based on industry and
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year. Dechow et al. (1998) expressed normal cash flows from operations as a linear function of
sales and change in sales in the current period.
The following cross-sectional regression was run for every industry and every year.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + α₁(1/At-1) + β₁(St/At-1) + β₂(ΔSt/At-1) + ε

(1)

Where assets are equal to A and sales are equal to S.
Following Roychowdhury (2006) 15 observations for each industry-year grouping were
required to run the regression. The four-digit industry code was used to divide the sample into
industries. Sensitivity analysis that could be added to the study would be to run the regressions
by a two-digit industry code and report the regression results.
Using the coefficients from this regression, normal cash flows were determined for each
firm in the sample. Normal cash flows were then subtracted from the actual cash flows reported
by the firm. If the actual cash flows were less than the normal cash flows, the firm was coded 1
since they have abnormally low cash flows. Future additions to the research could include
reporting the cash flows as abnormally low only if they were more than two standard deviations
below the normal level of cash flows.
Based on theory and prior literature the following variables are included in the model, but
other unknown variables may be determining factors that affect abnormally low cash flows.
Test Variables
The first hypothesis tests whether a firm receiving an AAER for revenue manipulation,
MANIPULATION, is associated with having abnormally low cash flows. The second and third
hypotheses test whether firms that receive an AAER will have abnormally low cash flows in the
period before, BEF_MAN, or after, AFT_MAN, the manipulation.
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Control Variables
Control variables are taken from Roychowdhury (2006) who examined whether firms
manipulate real activities. Real activities affect cash flows, and he found several factors that
significantly influence cash flow levels.
If a firm has higher current liabilities (CL) or debt (HASDEBT), cash flows may be lower
because of the payments that are required on this debt. CL is measured as current liabilities at
the beginning of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. HASDEBT is
coded as 1 if a firm has debt either at the beginning of the year or at the end of the year, 0
otherwise. Future sensitivity analysis could include the use of a debt ratio instead of the use of
the HASDEBT variable. A firm that has higher net income (INCOME) should have higher cash
flows. INVREC is calculated as the beginning of the year inventory and receivables scaled by
total assets at the beginning of the year. It is included to show the effect of inventory and
receivables levels on operating cash flows. A higher level of inventory would signify the use of
cash flows to invest in production. Accounts receivables that are higher reduce the amount of
revenues that have been collected and included in cash flows. Manufacturing firms (MFG) have
production costs that affect the level of cash flows. These production costs are not found in
nonmanufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms also use GAAP required absorption costing which
includes overhead costs as a part of inventory. These costs require the use of cash but do not
reduce net income. Roychowdhury (2006) used market-to-book (MTB) as a proxy for growth
firms. These firms may need to make investments of cash to sustain growth that other firms do
not experience. MTB is measured as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of
equity.
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The presence of abnormally low cash flows in a previous year (PREV_YR_CF_IND)
may influence current cash flows since a firm could find difficulties in bringing cash flows back
to normal levels. Size (SIZE) would also affect the level of cash flows since larger firms would
be expected to have more cash available from operations. SIZE is measured as the natural log of
the market value of equity.
Defond and Hung (2003) found that the level of accruals affect whether analysts will
provide a cash flow forecast and thus the level of cash flows. Accrual based earnings include
management’s subjective estimates of uncertain future events. These estimates may not translate
into actual cash flows, so a higher magnitude of accruals (ACCRMAG) may indicate lower cash
flows. ACCRMAG is measured as the absolute value of net income before extraordinary items
minus operating cash flows divided by total assets.

Results
Table 1 presents a summary of the sample observations. There were 365 firms identified
as manipulators of annual revenue. Complete information could not be found for 199 firms
leaving a sample of 163 firms. One firm had two separate periods of manipulations so there are
162 unique firms in the sample. 153 firms had multiple year manipulations. This increases the
number of firm years during the manipulation period to 274 giving an average manipulation
period of 1.68 years. As an additional control, the sample also includes periods that are two
years before (if available) and two years after (if available) the manipulation period. This
increases the total firm years in the sample to 630.
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Table 1- Summary of Sample Observations
Firms identified as annual revenue manipulators
Less: Firms with unavailable TIC symbol
Less: Firms with incomplete/unavailable data
Firms in final sample

365
(57)
(145)
163

Firms with multiple year manipulations
Firm years in final sample*
Firm years in manipulation period
Average number of years in manipulation period

153
630
274
1.68

*Includes data for two years before manipulation period (when available) and two years after
manipulation period (when available).
Table 2 provides the distribution of the sample by the first year of manipulation. The
period covered by the sample is from 1988 through 2005. The year with the highest number of
manipulating firms was 1997 with 23. The SEC found more revenue manipulating firms that
began the manipulations during the period from 1995 through 2001 with 107 of the 163 or 66%
of the firms beginning the manipulations of revenues during this period.
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Table 2 - Distribution of Sample by First Year of Manipulation

Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Firms
10
2
6
8
5
8
7
10
11
23
17
18
16
12
4
2
1
3

Percentage
by Year
6.1
1.2
3.7
5.0
3.1
5.0
4.3
6.1
6.8
14.1
10.4
11.0
9.8
7.3
2.5
1.2
0.6
1.8

163

100.0

Table 3 provides the distribution of the sample by industry. Forty-seven of the 163 firms
(29%) are in the business services industry. Higher numbers of firms also are included in
chemicals and allied products (12), industrial machinery and equipment (17), and electronic and
other electric equipment (14). The average years of manipulation by industry range from one to
almost three years.
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Table 3 - Distribution of Sample by Industry

15
16
20
23
25
27
28
33
34
35
36
37
38
50
51
54
56
57
58
59
73
78
79
80
82
87

Industry
Firms
General Building Contractors
1
Heavy Construction, Except Building
1
Food and Kindred Products
4
Apparel and Other Textile Products
4
Furniture and Fixtures
1
Printing and Publishing
2
Chemicals and Allied Products
12
Primary Metal Industries
1
Fabricated Metal Products
3
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
17
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
14
Transportation Equipment
2
Instruments and Related Products
14
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods
8
Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods
8
Food Stores
3
Apparel and Accessory Stores
2
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores
1
Eating and Drinking Places
1
Miscellaneous Retail
3
Business Services
47
Motion Pictures
1
Amusement and Recreation Services
4
Health Services
5
Educational Services
1
Engineering & Management Services
3
Total
163

% of
Number of
Average
Firms by
Years in
Years of
Industry Manipulation Manipulation
Period
0.6
2.00
2
0.6
1.00
1
2.5
2.50
10
2.5
1.75
7
0.6
2.00
2
1.2
2.00
4
7.4
1.67
20
0.6
2.00
2
1.8
1.00
3
10.4
1.35
23
8.6
1.57
22
1.2
1.00
2
8.6
1.71
24
5.0
1.38
11
5.0
2.38
19
1.8
2.00
6
1.2
1.00
2
0.6
1.00
1
0.6
2.00
2
1.8
1.67
5
28.8
1.68
79
0.6
1.00
1
2.5
2.00
8
3.1
2.80
14
0.6
1.00
1
1.8
1.00
3
100.0
274

Table 4 presents (untransformed) descriptive statistics for all variables in the logistic
regression model for the full sample of revenue manipulating firms and control firms. Forty-five
percent of the firms have abnormally low cash flows with 44% having abnormally low cash
flows in the previous year. Eighty-eight percent have debt. The minimum income as a
percentage of total assets for the sample is -9.00 and the maximum is 1.88 with a mean of -0.05
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and a median of 0.03. Forty-five percent of the firms are manufacturing firms. Size, the natural
log of the market value of equity, has a minimum of -1.90 and a maximum of 12.20 with a mean
of 5.51 and a median of 5.28.
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics (n = 1260)

Variable
ABN_CF_IND
ACCRMAG
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN
CL

HASDEBT
INCOME
INVREC
MANIPULATOR
MFG
MTB
Prev_Yr_CF_Ind

Mean
0.45
0.15
0.38
0.18
0.24
0.88
-0.05
0.35
0.50
0.45
5.34
0.44

Minimum Median
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.00
1.00
-9.00
0.03
0.00
0.33
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
-64.22
2.29
0.00
0.00

Std.
Maximum Deviation
1.00
0.49
11.09
0.47
1.00
0.49
1.00
0.39
3.41
0.19
1.00
0.32
1.88
0.39
0.91
0.21
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
1174.30
38.04
1.00
0.50

Univariate statistics in Table 5 report means for the firms that received an AAER for
revenue manipulation compared to firms that did not received an AAER for manipulating
revenues. Chi-square test statistics indicate significant differences in frequencies between
groups for firms that have abnormally low cash flows (p = 0.059), for firms that have debt
(p < 0.001), and for firms that have cash flows that are abnormally low in the previous year
(p = 0.072) . T-test statistics indicate significant differences between the groups for size
(p = 0.008).
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Table 5 – Univariate Statistics

Variable
ABN_CF_IND
ACCRMAG
CL

HASDEBT
INCOME
INVREC
MTB
PREV_YR_CF_IND
SIZE
Observations

Mean for firms Mean for firms Chireceiving an receiving no Square/ P-value
AAER for
AAER for
t(t- statistic
revenue
revenue
statistic p-value
manipulation manipulation (bolded) bolded)
0.54
0.36
3.541
0.059
0.17
0.13
-1.273
0.203
0.23
0..24
1.033
0.302
0.93
0.84
17.023
<0.0001
-0.07
-0.03
1.606
0.108
0.35
0.35
-0434
0.664
6.18
4.51
-0.779
0.436
0.51
0.36
3.225
0.072
5.70
5.33
-2.65
0.008
630
630

Note: Chi-square tests are performed for dichotomous variables. All others are
t-tests with the results bolded.

Table 6 presents bivariate correlation coefficients for all variables that appear in the
model. Most of the bivariate correlations are low.
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Table 6 - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models (n = 1260)
Variable
(1) ABN_CF_IND
(2) AFT_MAN

(1)
1.000

0.031
(0..268)
(3) BEF_MAN
-0.047
(0.093)
(4) CL
0.040
(0.151)
(5) HASDEBT
-0.003
(0.902)
(6) INCOME
-0.295
(0.000)
(7) INVREC
0.092
(0.001)
(8) MANIPULATOR
0.181
(0.000)
(9) MFG
-0.057
(0.042)
(10) MTB
-0.157
(0.000)
(11) PREV_YR_CF_ IND
0.367
0000
(12) SIZE
-0.074
(0.008)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1.000
-0.372
(0.000)
0.055
(0.053)
-0.015
(0.592)
-0.159
(0.000)
-0.038
(0.180)
-0.001
(0.982)
0.060
(0.032)
-0.105
(0.000)
0.105
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.902)

1.000
0.011
(0.699)
0.010
(.0730)
0.103
(0.000)
0.074
(0.009)
0.002
(0.952)
-0.033
(0.248)
0.026
(0.356)
-0.058
(0.041)
-0.057
(0.043)

1.000
-0.026
(0.363)
0.010
(0.713)
0.349
(0.000)
-0.083
(0.003)
-0.114
(0.000)
0.108
(0.000)
0.063
(0.025)
0.002
(0.947)

1.000
-0.059
(0.036)
0.110
(0.000)
0.139
(0.000)
0.096
(0.001)
-0.089
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.815)
0.021
(0.456)

1.000
0.132
(0.000)
-0.137
(0.000)
0.011
(0.688)
0.226
(0.000)
-0.268
(0.000)
0.181
(0.000)
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1.000
0.011
(0.684)
0.213
(0.000)
-0.076
(0.007)
0.146
(0.000)
-0.302
(0.000)

1.000
-0.001
(0.980)
0.059
(0.038)
0.150
(0.000)
0.066
(0.019)

1.000
0.038
(0.175)
-0.053
(0.060)
-0.022
(0.437)

1.000
-0.162
(0.000)
0.283
(0.000)

1.000
-0.128
(0.000)

1.000

(13)

Table 7 presents the results of four different logistic regressions. In a logistic regression,
parameter signs and p-values are used to determine the effect and strength of the relationship for
independent variables. The first model uses the full sample of firms (1260). This sample
includes all firm years including the manipulation period, a period before the manipulation
period, and a period after the manipulation period. Controls, BEF_MAN and AFT_MAN, are
included for the periods before and after the manipulation period. The pseudo R² for the model
(.144) indicates a reasonable amount of variation left unexplained. The variable of interest,
MANIPULATOR (p <.0001) (H1), is significant in this model indicating that the manipulation
of revenues is related to abnormally low cash flows. Other variables that are also related to
abnormally low cash flows are INCOME (<.0001), INVREC (0.0142), MFG (0.053),
PREV_YR_CF_IND (<.0001), and SIZE(0.0003). The signs for the estimates of
MANIPULATOR, INVREC, and PREV_YR_CF_IND are positive indicating that the
probability of abnormally low cash flows increases if a firm manipulates revenues, has a higher
level of inventory and receivables, or has abnormally low cash flows in a previous year. The
sign for INCOME, MFG, and SIZE is negative so the probability of abnormally low cash flows
decreases with increases in income and size and if a firm is a manufacturer.
To further investigate the relationship between the variables and abnormally low cash
flows, the reduced models also are presented in Table 7 and separate the sample into time
periods. The reduced samples include firm years for the period of the manipulation, the period
before the manipulation, and the period after the manipulation.
The reduced models indicate that the manipulation of revenues is related to abnormally
low cash flows during the manipulation period but is not related before or after the manipulation
period. This supports H1 and H2. In each of the three models INCOME and
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PREV_YR_CF_IND are significant. INCOME has a negative coefficient sign and
PREV_YR_CF_IND has a positive sign. This is consistent with the relationships shown in the
full model. In the model for the manipulation period, HASDEBT and INVREC are also
significant. HASDEBT has a negative coefficient sign indicating that the probability of
abnormally low cash flows decreases for firms that have debt during the manipulation period.
This variable is not significant in the other reduced models. INVREC has a positive coefficient
sign as in the full sample model. In the model for firm years before the manipulation period, CL
is significant with a negative sign showing that the probability of abnormally low cash flows
decreases for firms with higher current liabilities as a percentage of assets during this time
period.
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Table 7 - Logistic Regression Results
ABN_CF_IND =  +  ACCRMAG +  AFT_MAN +  BEF_MAN +
 CL +  HASDEBT +  INCOME +  INVREC +
 MANIPULATOR +  MFG +  MTB+  PREV_YR_CF_IND
+  SIZE + 

Expected
Sign
Variable
Intercept
ACCRMAG
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN
CL

HASDEBT
INCOME
INVREC
MANIPULATOR
MFG
MTB
PREV_YR_CF_IND
SIZE
Observations
Pseudo R2
LR Statistic
Prob (LR statistic)

?
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Full
Model
Parameter
Estimate
-0.635
0.002
-0.104
-0.145
0.103
-0.131
-0.846
0.496
0.077
-0.153
0.0005
0.815
-0.636

Reduced
Model
Manip.
Full
Period
Model Parameter
P-value Estimate
0.0003 -0.820
0.985
0.444
0.223
0.167
0.655
0.060
0.279
-0.437
<.0001 -0.826
0.014
0.922
<.0001
0.600
0.053
-0.197
0.692
-0.006
<.0001
0.807
0.0003
0.027
1260
.144
249.813
<0.0001
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Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced
Model
Model
Model
Model
Manip. Before Before
After
Period Manip. Manip. Manip.
P-Value Parameter P-Value Parameter
Estimate
Estimate
0.002
-0.280
0.519
-0.864
0.120
-0.015
0.968
-0.082

Reduced
Model
After
Manip.
P-Value

0.903
0.012
0.001
0.006
<.0001
0.111
0.409
<.0001
0.289
548
.169
127.722

0.140
0.613
<.0001
0.418
0.232
0.177
0.898
<.0001
0.819
484
.165
110.712

<0.0001

-1.506
0.022
-0.718
0.621
0.139
-0.038
0.002
0.728
-0050

0.062
0.941
0.042
0.243
0.436
0.836
0.620
0.0001
0.205
228
.113
34.648
0.0001

0.467
0.099
-1.050
0.262
0.156
-0.174
0.001
0.871
-0.007

0.003
0.363

<0.0001

Firms that manipulate revenues may continue this activity for more than one reporting
period. To understand how cash flows are affected by the manipulation of revenues during the
manipulation period logistic regressions are performed by dividing the manipulation period
sample into two samples, one for the first year of the manipulation (sample size 290) and one for
the subsequent years of manipulation (sample size 258). Table 8 presents the results of these
logistic regressions.
In both models, MANIPULATOR is significant and positive. P =0.002 in the model for
the first year of the manipulation and P < .0001 in the model for subsequent years. This indicates
that there is a probability that firms that manipulate revenues will have cash flows that are
abnormally low by a significant amount during the entire manipulation period.
PREV_YR_CF_IND also is significant and positive in both models. In the model for the first
year of the manipulation INCOME is significant and negative and INVREC is significant and
positive. In the model for the subsequent years of the manipulation, HASDEBT is the only other
variable that is significant, and it has a negative coefficient.
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Table 8 - Logistic Regression Results
ABN_CF_IND =  +  ACCRMAG +  AFT_MAN +  BEF_MAN +
 CL +  HASDEBT +  INCOME +  INVREC +
 MANIPULATOR +  MFG +  MTB+  PREV_YR_CF_IND
+  SIZE + 

Reduced Model Reduced Model Reduced Model Reduced Model
1st Year of
1st Year of Subsequent Yrs Subsequent Yrs
Expected Manipulation Manipulation of Manipulation of Manipulation
Sign
Parameter
Parameter
Variable
Estimate
P-Value
Estimate
P-value
Intercept
?
-1.072
0.005
-0.611
0.134
ACCRMAG
+
0.348
0.561
0.489
0.170
CL
+
0.286
0.681
-0.201
0.805
HASDEBT
+
-0.201
0.433
-0.788
0.006
INCOME
-1.324
0.0001
-0.453
0.135
INVREC
+
1.147
0.014
0.598
0.282
MANIPULATOR
+
0.517
0.002
0.749
0.0001
MFG
-0.221
0.183
-0.126
0.525
MTB
-0.008
0.442
0.014
0.252
PREV_YR_CF_IND
+
0.631
0.0002
0.993
<.0001
SIZE
0.053
0.162
0.283
0.478
Observations
290
258
2
Pseudo R
.161
.212
LR Statistic
64.614
4.123
Prob (LR statistic)
<0.0001
<0.0001
\
Summary and Conclusions
Prior research has investigated the characteristics of firms that manipulate their financial
statements. This research has been performed to develop variables that can be used to predict
firm financial statement fraud. The findings have shown that, among other things, these firms are
growth firms with higher accruals and accounts receivable. The research in this area has not
focused on a specific type of financial statement fraud such as the manipulation of revenues
which is the focus of this research.
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Revenues are the account most often manipulated and can be the most costly.
Understanding the signs of revenue manipulations could provide auditors, investors, and
regulators information to help them recognize firms that could be potential revenue
manipulators. One such indicator could be found in the statement of cash flows.
The statement of cash flows has been considered as one of the “cleaner” financial
statements since it may be is less subject to manipulation than the income statement. Analysts
believe that cash flow from operations that is a part of the statement of cash flows provides
information to assess the quality of net income. Their concern is with revenue recognition or
expense accrual practices that may yield higher than actual net income. If cash flows are low in
relation to net income, then the net income is suspect.
Cash flows from operations may also provide insight into fraudulent revenue
manipulation practices. As revenues increase, there is an expectation that cash flows from core
operations also will increase. When revenues are increased by manipulation, the fraudulently
recorded revenues would not produce this increase in operating cash flows, and cash flows
would be abnormally low.
This study provides evidence that cash flows may be an indicator of fraudulent revenue
manipulations. Firms that manipulate revenues were found to have significantly lower cash
flows from operations than firms that did not manipulate revenues during the period of the
revenue manipulation. Findings also show that the manipulating firms did not have abnormally
low cash flows in the period before or after the period of the manipulation
One limitation of this study is the use of AAERs to obtain the sample. The use of
AAERs results in the use of a smaller sample than the samples found in other research, but this
study includes a larger sample than most published studies using AAERs. The use of AAERs
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may also reduce the generalizability of the results to other entities. The SEC investigates
manipulations that are economically significant and this may mean that the firms in the sample
consist of larger firms.
Another limitation of the study is that the model leaves a significant amount of variation
unexplained. Future research can determine other variables that could provide further insight
into the variation in cash flows.
Future research may also be used to determine other factors that can be used as indicators
of revenue manipulators. A review of the sample revealed that several firms had initial public
offerings in a short time period before the manipulation. They may be growth firms with
management that is attempting to meet earnings or cash flow predictions. They also may have
weak corporate governance that led to the ability of management to manipulate the financial
statement.
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Chapter 3
THE EFFECT OF REVENUE MANIPULATIONS ON DISCRETIONARY
EXPENDITURES
Abstract
This study investigates whether firms that manipulate revenues will also decrease
discretionary expenditures in an attempt to manage cash flows from operations and hide the
manipulations. Specifically, the paper considers whether managers who manipulate revenues
will decrease discretionary expenditures in order to increase cash flows since abnormally low
cash flows from operations may be an indicator of revenue manipulations.
Even though revenue is the account that is most often manipulated, there are serious costs
to the firm and management when revenue manipulations are discovered. These costs include
litigation, restatements, unfavorable audit reports, increased audit fees, negative market
reactions, and investigations and sanctions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
To avoid detection, management has incentives to hide their fraudulent actions. When managers
manipulate revenues, they know that stakeholders may recognize this manipulation by looking at
other accounts included in the financial statements. For example, analysts and auditors often
assess the quality of earnings by looking at cash flows from operations. The concern is that
revenue recognition and expense accrual practices may yield high earnings but low cash flows.
Thus cash flow from operations is a check on revenues and earnings, and analysts, auditors, and
creditors develop cash flow expectations.
Prior research shows that managers manage discretionary expenditures to meet
expectations. Other research suggests that discretionary expenditures are difficult to manage in
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the short term. This research uses a sample of revenue manipulators to test whether discretionary
expenditures are used to reach cash flow expectations.
The results of the study do not support the theory that discretionary expenditures are
managed on a short term basis to hide revenue manipulations. The reason may be that
discretionary expenditures are “sticky” and difficult to manage on a short term basis. This has
been suggested in other research (Anderson et al. 2002). Future research can investigate this
possibility.
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Introduction
When managers manipulate income statement earnings, they understand that auditors,
investors, and creditors may recognize the manipulations by evaluating the financial statements
as a whole. Managers understand this association and would have an incentive to manage the
other financial statements to avoid discovery. For example, analysts often assess the quality of
the income statement revenues, net income, and accruals by examining the cash flow statement
and cash flows from operations. It follows that if management manipulates any part of the
income statement, they would have an incentive to manage cash flows from operations. One way
to manage these cash flows is through a reduction in discretionary expenditures. This research is
an exploratory study to provide insight into the association between revenue manipulations and
the management of cash flows to hide those manipulations. It investigates whether managers
attempt to hide fraudulent revenue manipulations through a decrease in discretionary
expenditures.
Theory and previous research would suggest that managers would decrease discretionary
expenditures in order to hide revenue manipulations. Revenues are increasing which should lead
to an increase in cash flows from operations. Cash flow projections would be based on the
increasing revenues, but if revenues are fraudulently increased, cash flows would not increase. In
order to align cash flows and revenues, managers would take steps to increase cash flows. An
effective an efficient way to increase cash flows in a short term manner would be through a
reduction of discretionary expenditures which is within the bounds of GAAP. Previous research
in real earnings management has shown that management uses real activity manipulation to
manage cash flows in order to meet short term goals (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991;
Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006). For example they will reduce discretionary expenditures in
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order to meet earnings targets. This theory suggests that management would decrease
discretionary expenditures in order to increase cash flows to meet projections based on revenues,
but there is an alternative theory that has received less attention.
The alternative theory concerns the area of “sticky costs.” Sticky costs occur when
resources cannot be adjusted in the short term because “forces (are) acting to restrain or slow the
downward adjustment process more than the upward adjustment process” (Anderson et al. 2002,
49). In other words, it is difficult for managers to adjust discretionary expenditures in a short
time frame since there are costs associated with an adjustment to discretionary expenditures.
There has been much less research in this area, but the results show that managers are less likely
to reduce discretionary expenditures to meet short term goals.
These two research streams offer alternative theories of how easily management can
reduce discretionary expenditures in the short term even when given a strong incentive to do so.
Can managers quickly reduce discretionary expenditures if cash flows are less than projections
based on revenues that are fraudulently manipulated?
The cash flow statement has often been considered one of the cleaner financial statements
since cash is viewed as less subject to manipulation, but managers have incentives to manipulate
cash flows. As stated by Bernstein (1993), “CFO (cash flow from operations), as a measure of
performance, is less subject to distortion than is the net income figure. This is so because the
accrual system, which produced the income number, relies on accruals, deferrals, allocations,
and valuation, all of which involve higher degrees of subjectivity than what enters the
determination of CFO. That is why analysts prefer to relate CFO to reported net income as a
check on the quality of that income. Some analysts believe that the higher the ratio of CFO to
net income, the higher the quality of that income. Put another way, a company with a high level
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of net income and a low cash flow may be using income recognition or expense accrual criteria
that are suspect.” (p. 41)
The focus of this research is on fraudulent income recognition practices and possible
attempts to hide that manipulation. GAAP and SEC regulations require that certain criteria must
be met for revenue to be recognized. There must be persuasive evidence that a sales
arrangement exists; delivery must have occurred or services must have been rendered; the
seller’s price to the buyer must be fixed or determinable; and collectability must be reasonably
assured. Managers often increase revenues outside the bounds of these regulations. They may
want to increase their personal compensation through bonuses that are based on performance, or
to meet analysts’ projections, or a plethora of other reasons.
Managers have developed many different tactics to manipulate revenues that circumvent
these regulations. A few popular ones are channel stuffing, round-tripping, undisclosed side
agreements, or fraudulent bill and hold transactions. Channel stuffing involves increasing current
sales by forcing products into a firm’s distribution channel prematurely with no expectation that
it will be sold. Bristol-Myers used channel stuffing to orchestrate an alleged $2.5 billion fraud
by offering incentives to wholesalers to build up their inventories so that Bristol-Myers could
meet sales forecasts. In round-tripping, a company will agree to make offsetting purchases with
another company. Side agreements give customers the opportunity to cancel sales contracts, but
the revenue is recognized when the initial contract is made. Computer Associates recognized
fraudulent revenue of $2.2 billion by agreeing to make offsetting purchases (round tripping).
They also made contracts with customers that included undisclosed side letters that could have
canceled the contracts. In bill and hold arrangements, companies may record sales prematurely
before the customer takes title to the product or before the product is shipped. Companies may
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also record fictitious revenue by creating false invoices or by recording sales from expired
contracts. MiniScribe Corporation, a manufacturer of hard drives, used bill and hold
arrangements and false invoicing in a much publicized case of revenue manipulation. In 1987,
they increased their sales by 95 percent in one year by booking sales that they sent to their own
warehouse instead of when they were shipped to customers. Because of this manipulation, they
were named as one of the top growth companies in the electronics industry which led investors to
invest in this rapidly growing company. Maintaining this level of growth became difficult,
especially since it was based on fraudulently recorded revenues. In order to maintain their
growth level and stock value, MiniScribe developed other fraudulent methods. They packaged
bricks as finished products and shipped them to distributors at the end of the year. All of these
methods manipulate revenues but ultimately may not increase cash flows.
When managers manipulate the recognition of income by fraudulently increasing
revenues, they increase net income and accruals. Since net income is equal to cash flows plus
accruals, cash flows remain constant, but the expectation is that as revenues increase, cash flows
should also increase. There should be a “normal” level of cash flows based on revenues.
Empirically, Dechow et al. (1998) expresses normal cash flow from operations as a linear
function of sales and change in sales in the current period. Analysts and auditors also compute
normal cash flows, and creditors are interested in cash flow levels.
Auditors often determine an expected level of cash flows from operations during the
performance of analytical procedures. Analytical procedures are used by auditors to evaluate
financial statement accounts by studying and comparing relationships among financial data.
They are used during both the planning and final review stages of the audit and can extend the
work of the auditor, thus increasing auditing fees. Analysts do cash flow projections to evaluate
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the quality of a firm’s revenue recognition and accrual practices. Attempts to meet projections of
analysts have been the motivation behind many financial statement frauds since failure to meet
projections can affect stock price and the cost of external financing. Creditors use cash flows for
firm valuation and debt-service capacity which determines the amount of capital that the firm has
access to as well as the cost of that capital.
Since managers want to meet analysts’ projections, reduce auditing fees, and reduce the
cost of capital, they have an incentive to manage cash flows and may attempt to bring cash flows
into agreement with recorded revenues.

In other words, they want cash flows to be at “normal”

levels based on revenues. Since the cash flow statement is considered to be less subject to
management, can cash flows from operations be managed to “normal” levels when revenues
have been manipulated?
Anecdotal reports point out that cash flows can be managed. Management of cash flows
may be either within or outside the bounds of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP). Methods that have been reported by the investment community to warn investors of
possible cash flow management include dishonesty in accounts payable, selling of accounts
receivables (securitization), and questionable capitalization of expenses. On June 25, 2002,
Worldcom announced that not only had they inflated earnings but also cash flows in the previous
five quarters. As part of the cash flow manipulation they classified operating leases as capital
expenditures which shifted the payments from the operating section of the cash flow statement to
the investing section. Hertz used the purchase of vehicles to manipulate the investing and
operating section of the financial statements; they had purchase agreements with car
manufacturers that included a repurchase agreement after 10 months. They then reported the
purchase of the vehicles as an investment outflow and reported the proceeds from the repurchase
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as an operating inflow. Companies also use accounts payable to increase operating cash flows.
When companies write checks for outstanding payments, the payment should decrease accounts
payable, but while the check is in the mail, a cash-manipulating company will not deduct the
amount and the cash remains in operating cash flows. Companies use the treatment of overdrafts
under GAAP to boost operating cash flows. Under GAAP, overdrafts are lumped into accounts
payable which are added back to operating cash flows. Abercrombie & Fitch used cash
overdrafts in fiscal 2006 to show a cash balance of over $80 million when the real cash balance
was around $60 million. They made a deposit the day after the year end to cover the overdraft.
As shown by these examples, managers will manage cash flows from operations when they have
the opportunity and incentives.
In addition to this anecdotal information, academic research has shown that managers use
non-fraudulent real activity manipulation, defined as “deviations from normal business
activities” (Roychowdhury 2006, p. 336), to meet earnings thresholds. Early research in this area
focused on decreased spending on research and development (R&D) to meet earnings thresholds
(Baber et al. 1991; Bushee 1998) or to increase short-term earnings shortly before a CEO left the
company (Dechow and Sloan 1991). Real activity manipulations can also take the form of a
decrease in discretionary expenditures. Roychowdhury (2006) found that managers will not
only decrease R&D, but also Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&A) expenses to meet
earnings projections. While this research has shown that managers use real activity
manipulations to manage cash to meet earnings targets, managers may also use the same
methods to hide fraudulent revenue manipulations or meet cash flow projections. By decreasing
discretionary expenditures, cash flow levels comply with revenues even when the revenues are
fraudulently recorded and will not produce actual future cash flows.
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While the research into real earnings manipulation has received considerable attention
and shows promise for future research, other studies have shown that discretionary expenditures
may be more difficult to manage in the short term. This research looks at the “stickiness” of
certain committed resources. These costs include SG&A costs.
SG&A costs are generally considered to be variable costs and easy to adjust when
needed, as in when volume decreases, but research shows that there are costs to this adjustment.
Anderson et al. (2002) found that there are forces that restrain or slow down the adjustment
process. They call these costs “sticky” costs. Adjustment costs include such things as severance
pay when employees are dismissed and the future search and training costs when these
employees are rehired. There are other costs in addition to the out-of-pocket costs. These
include organizational costs such as loss of morale among remaining employees when associates
are terminated. Managers’ may also find it difficult to reduce these committed costs because of
personal considerations which result in a form of agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
found that managers make decisions that will maximize their own personal utility, but these
decisions may not be optimal to the firm’s stockholders. Managers may find it difficult to reduce
costs if the reduction causes a loss in status such as when a division is downsized. Managers
may also feel distress over dismissing familiar employees. In summary, managers may find it
difficult to adjust these discretionary expenditures in the short term.
Sticky cost research and real earnings management research present two different
theories about managements’ adjustment of discretionary expenditures to meet targets such as
earnings or cash flow projections. The results of the current study do not support the theory that
discretionary expenditures are managed in order to hide the manipulation of revenue
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manipulations. This may indicate that discretionary costs are in fact hard to decrease on a short term basis.
The results of the linear regression show that management does not decrease
discretionary expenditures in order to hide manipulated revenues even if managers want cash
flows from operations to align with reported revenues. The average time in the manipulation
period for the firms in the sample used in the current study is 1.68 years. Management may have
been unable to adjust the discretionary expenditures in this time frame, or they chose not to
suffer the costs of making the adjustment. Adjustment costs include out-of-pocket costs such as
severance pay for employees who are dismissed. There are also management’s personal
considerations. They may feel that they lose status because of “downsizing” when discretionary
costs are decreased. Other reasons for the lack of decreases in discretionary expenditures may
have to do with personal beliefs about the future performance of the firm. Management believes
that the revenue manipulations are only temporary until true revenues reach expectations. They
do not believe that they will need to manipulate revenues for an extended period of time and
believe in their own abilities to meet future expectations though non-fraudulent means. They
justify their actions in the short term until they can turn things around. Because of this, they
believe that their actions will not be discovered so there is no need to take extensive actions to
hide the manipulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
background of SEC Enforcement Actions. The third section includes prior research and the
fourth section develops the hypotheses. The fifth section describes the methodology. The sixth
section reports the empirical results and discussion. The final section includes the summary and
concluding remarks.
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Background of SEC Enforcement Actions
Firms that have been issued an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER)
by the SEC are used as the sample for this study. SEC enforcement actions are taken against
firms that are identified as having violated the financial reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC obtains leads for investigation from several sources: (1) public
complaints and tips; (2) the reporting requirements of federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies under the Bank Secrecy Act; (3) the enforcement staff of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board; (4) the enforcement of “blue sky laws” by state securities
regulators; (5) complaints and other information from members of Congress on behalf of
constituents whom they represent; (6) trading related referrals from domestic self-regulatory
organizations (SROS); (7) and their own examinations of financial statements (SEC, 2010b).
SEC staff members from the Division of Corporation Finance examine financial
statements and other filings for routine screening criteria violations and for suspicious subjective
factors. If a firm is suspected of fraudulent activity because of screening or because of a tip from
another source, the firm is investigated. When the initial investigation exposes factors that
warrant further investigation, an informal investigation is conducted, and persons with relevant
information are invited to provide pertinent documents and testimony. The SEC need not
formally notify the target firm during this investigation, thus protecting firms that will be cleared
by the informal investigation. If strong evidence of a securities law violation is uncovered
during the informal investigation, the SEC may pursue a formal investigation. The formal
investigation grants subpoena power to compel testimony and the production of documents. If
the SEC informs the target of the formal investigation, the 1934 Act Release No. 5092 requires
disclosure to shareholders by the firm, and the investigation may become public. The SEC
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policy is to make its enforcement activities public only when it files a formal complaint alleging
securities law violations and seeks settlement with the enforcement target.
According to the SEC enforcement manual dated January 13, 2010 which includes
conforming revisions as of March 3, 2010 (SEC 2010b), the SEC ranks investigations and
allocates resources to them based on the listings and rankings of associate directors and regional
directors who list their top ten investigations and rank their top three investigations. These
rankings are based on three factors, the programmatic importance of an enforcement action; the
magnitude of potential violations; and the resources required to investigate the potential
violations. Feroz et al. (1991) point out that the SEC ranks a target according to the probability
of success since there are more targets for investigation than the SEC can practically pursue, and
since the investigations are both costly and highly visible. Of the firms that were investigated
formally in 2009, 94% were resolved in favor of the SEC (SEC 2010a, p. 30).
Hypotheses Development
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), “Earnings management occurs when managers
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices.”(p. 368)
Earnings management generally focuses on accruals management which is inside the bound of
GAAP, but earnings management can be fraudulent and outside the bounds of GAAP. In either
case it may not be performance enhancing for the firm.
Finding that a firm’s financial statements include revenues that do not follow GAAP
regulations is evidence that management has knowingly used earnings management to increase
revenues through fraudulent means. If managers are fraudulently manipulating income outside of
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GAAP, they may also be operating within GAAP guidelines to manage other parts of the
financial statements. This may happen when managers are manipulating revenues.
When management manipulates revenues, they must consider ways in which auditors,
investors and regulators might discover the fraud. One indication that revenues may be other
than the reported amount would be a lower than expected operating cash flow. Subramayam and
Wild (2009) state that, “Accounting accruals determining net income rely on estimates, deferrals,
allocations, and valuation. These considerations sometimes allow more subjectivity than do the
factors determining cash flows. For this reason we often relate cash flows from operations to net
income in assessing its quality. Some users consider earnings of higher quality when the ratio of
cash flows from operations divided by net income is greater. This derives from a concern with
revenue recognition or expense accrual criteria yielding high net income but low cash flows.
Cash flows from operations effectively serve as a check on net income, but not as a substitute for
net income”.(p. 412) This reasoning provides an incentive for managers to maintain operating
cash flow levels that are reasonable when compared to revenues. In other words, they want to
maintain an expected level of cash flows.
Auditors often determine an expected level of cash flows from operations during the
performance of analytical procedures. Analytical procedures are used by auditors to evaluate
financial statement accounts by studying and comparing relationships among financial data.
They are used during both the planning and final review stages of the audit and can extend the
work of the auditor, thus increasing auditing fees. Creditors use cash flows for firm valuation
and debt-service capacity which determines the amount of capital that the firm has access to as
well as the cost of that capital. Analysts do cash flow projections to evaluate the quality of a
firm’s revenue recognition and accrual practices.

53

Empirical evidence has shown an increased interest in cash flow projections. Graham et
al. (2005) showed that cash flows have become an important measure of firm performance even
if earnings are still considered the most important performance measure. The importance of any
indicator often leads to a projection of that indicator. Recent financial forecasts have shown an
increase in the availability of analysts’ cash flow forecasts since cash flow information provides
information about the firm in addition to that provided by earnings forecasts. This interest in
cash flows and their projections has led to empirical research in this area. Defond and Hung
(2003) studied the increase in cash flow predictions in order to develop an understanding of the
characteristics common to firms that receive a cash flow forecast and thus the reasons that a firm
will receive a cash flow projection. One explanation may be that a cash flow forecasts may be
informative about firms with large accruals and may be used to confirm earnings information.
Earnings are more subjective than cash flows since they contain estimates.

Since management

realizes that stakeholders are examining the cash flow statements and analysts are making
predictions about cash flows, they will be motivated to manage cash flows if they are
manipulating revenues since fraudulently increasing revenues may not lead to increasing cash
flows.
Prior research concerning real earnings management has looked at cash flow
management and the management of operational activities. The early work focused on
investment activities, such as reductions of research and development expenditures. Bens et al.
(2002, 2003) found that managers repurchase stock to avoid EPS dilution arising from (a)
employee stock option exercises, and (b) employee stock option grants, and that they partially
finance these repurchases by reducing R&D. Dechow and Sloan (1991) found that CEOs reduce
spending on R&D toward the end of their tenure to increase short-term earnings. Baber et al.
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(1991) and Bushee (1998) provided evidence that managers reduce R&D expenditures to meet
earnings benchmarks. Research has also posited that managers engage in other types of real
earnings management. The recent work of Roycowdhury (2006) in this area has received a
considerable amount of attention. Dechow et al. (2011) stated that Rochowdhury (2006)
provided a needed preliminary step in the direction of a useful area of future research that would
“develop measures of earnings quality that capture cash-based earnings manipulation”. (p.4).
One of the findings in this paper was that managers will reduce discretionary expenditures to
improve reported margins. Roychowdhury (2006) defined discretionary expenditures as a total of
R&D, SG&A, and advertising expenditures.
These findings point out that management will use discretionary expenditures to meet
short-term targets. Meeting the cash flow projections of auditors, investors, and creditors may be
one of the targets that management is motivated to meet. If this is the case, management has an
incentive to decrease discretionary expenditures in order to manage cash flows to normal levels
when revenues are manipulated. This is one theory concerning the management of cash flows
through discretionary expenditures, but there is a competing theory.
Another theory that provides evidence about management’s actions to decrease
discretionary expenditures is found in the “sticky costs” research. Costs are sticky if the
“magnitude of the increase in costs associated with an increase in volume is greater than the
magnitude of the decrease in costs associated with an equivalent decrease in volume” (Anderson,
et al. 2002, p. 48). In other words, costs are sticky if they decrease more slowly than the increase.
Sticky costs are discretionary costs and management has control over the level of spending, but
they may be difficult to reduce. Management has committed resources in the past which may
include salaries or the development of different divisions of the company. If the level of
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spending is reduced, adjustment costs will be incurred. These adjustment costs include out-ofpocket costs such as severance pay when employees are dismissed and search and training costs
when they are rehired. There are also organizational costs such as the loss of morale among the
remaining employees. The firm may suffer agency costs as well. Agency costs arise when
managers put their self-interest above the firm and maximize their personal utility when their
decisions may not be optimal for the firm’s stockholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
Management may not want to decrease discretionary expenditures if they feel that they may
suffer a loss of status when a division is downsized. They also may feel anguish from dismissing
a familiar employee.
In summary, even though there are two theories concerning discretionary expenditures,
more research published recently shows that managers will manage financial statement accounts
by increasing or decreasing discretionary expenditures. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H1: Managers will decrease discretionary expenditures in order to increase cash flows
from operations and conceal revenue manipulations.
Methodology
Sample Selection
The sample for this study is selected from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC. There are alternative sources for identifying financial
statement manipulators such as the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database or the
Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits. The GAO database consists of a large number
of restatements, and a restatement is included even if the reason for the restatement is immaterial
and does not have economic significance. There also may not have been managerial intent to
commit a fraudulent act. The GAO database also only identifies the year that the restatement
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was identified in the press. This would not provide information about the period of time that the
firm manipulated the financial statements. The Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits
reports shareholder lawsuits which may typically arise from material intentional manipulations,
but it also would include lawsuits that are brought for reasons that are unrelated to financial
manipulations. The sample of the current study must be made up of firms that have issued
financial statements that include GAAP violations concerning revenue manipulations that are
economically significant and were made with the intent of misleading investors. The SEC only
issues an AAER when there has been a significant financial statement manipulation and
management has the intent to commit fraud.
Enforcement actions and investigations are brought by the SEC pursuant to Section 13(a)
of the Securities Act of 1934 in which the Commission alleges that the firm has overstated
earnings in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Under Section
13(a), firms whose securities are registered with the SEC must file reports that are required by
the SEC including quarterly and annual financial statements. These statements must comply
with Regulation S-X which requires conformity with GAAP.
The SEC investigates firms that may be in violation of SEC and federal rules, and they
may take action against firms, auditors, management, and other parties that are involved in the
violations. According to Dechow et al. (2011), the SEC checks for compliance with GAAP by
reviewing about one-third of the financial statements issued by public companies each year.
Dechow et al. (1996) identify other sources that may lead to an investigation including
anonymous tips from employees, insiders, journalists, and analysts, and voluntary restatements
by the firm itself. If they believe that there is an inconsistency with GAAP in the financial
statements, they can initiate an informal inquiry and gather additional information. The SEC
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may drop the case after this informal investigation, or they may take further steps which may
lead to enforcement actions. This may include the issuance of an AAER as well as requiring the
firm to pay damages, restate financial statements, or change accounting methods.

Manipulation period

Informal
Investigation

Enforcement Leads
Received by SEC

SEC Investigation Disclosed

Formal Investigation

Issuance of AAER

Figure 2
Timeline of SEC Investigation

The sample in the current study consists of firms that received an AAER for manipulating
annual financial statements and excludes those firms that manipulated quarterly earnings.
Management may be more concerned with manipulating revenues at year end to meet earnings
targets. Cash flows and revenues may also vary at the quarterly level due to seasonality in
business. Also excluded from the sample were firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between
4400 and 5000) and banks and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). This
follows prior research.
The sample was taken from two sources. The first source is a database developed by
Dechow et al. (2011) of firms that includes information from a review of AAERS from the SEC
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website. The second source is provided by an examination of the individual AAERs issues by
the SEC.
Dechow et al. (2011) compiled a database of information from 2,191 AAERs issued by
the SEC from May 17th, 1982 through June 10th, 2005. This database includes three files: the
Detail, Annual, and Quarterly files. The Detail file provides firm identifiers, a description of
why the AAER was issued, and the balance sheet and income statement accounts that are
affected. The Annual and Quarterly files are compiled from the Detail file and are formatted by
reporting period so the information can be matched to financial databases such as Compustat and
CRSP. This database includes all of the AAERS issued during a specific period of time, but the
current study is an investigation of only revenue manipulating firms. To obtain a sample of
firms that manipulate revenues, the database was sorted based on the reason for the AAER, the
accounts that were affected, and the year(s) of the manipulation. This database includes
information on AAERs beginning in 1982. The sample can only include firms that manipulated
revenues after 1986 since the study investigates the relationship between revenue manipulation
and operating cash flows. Data on operating cash flows is available on Compustat only after
1986. From the 2,191 AAERs included in the database, 307 individual firms were identified as
annual revenue manipulators after 1984.
The second source for the sample was the AAERs issued by the SEC. A review of 913
individual AAERS were examined and information was hand collected to extend the sample of
revenue manipulators from June 10th, 2005 through January 19th, 2010 . In order to assure that
information collected and decisions made during the collection process were the same for this
sample in comparison to the database from Dechow et al. (2011), a sample of AAERs for 33
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different firms that were included in the Dechow database were reviewed and information
collected. The information collected was identical to the information from the Dechow database.
As the SEC investigates and sanctions firms, multiple AAERS may be issued for a single
firm, and action may be taken against various parties associated with the firm. Dechow et al.
(2011) report that of the 2,191 AAERs included in their database, “the SEC took action against
2,592 different parties” (p. 15) including officers of the company, the firm itself, the auditor, the
attorney, and other parties such as consultants and investment bankers. Several AAERs may be
issued for the same firm with different information provided in each AAER. AAERs are not in a
standard format and the information provided will depend on who writes the AAER. The
information includes details about each case and the resultant sanctions and penalties that result
from the investigation. Conflicting information, such as the time period of the violation, may be
found in different AAERs. This information must be investigated to determine the correct data.
An examination of the Dechow database provided guidance about gathering the appropriate data.
AAERs are issued for a variety of different financial statement manipulations. For
example, major enforcement cases in 2009 included actions involving subprime-related
securities, actions involving auction rate securities, actions involving offering frauds/Ponzi
schemes, actions involving broker-dealers, actions involving mutual funds and investment
advisers, actions involving financial fraud and issuer disclosure, and actions involving insider
trading (SEC, 2010a). The focus of the current study will be on those actions that involve
financial statement fraud through fraudulent revenue manipulation.
Following Dechow et al. (2011) each of the 913 AAERs from June 10th, 2005 through
January 19th, 2010 was separately examined to determine whether a GAAP violation involving
an annual revenue manipulation was involved. When a firm was identified as an annual revenue
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manipulator, the reporting periods were identified. AAERs do not provide information about
company identifiers. These were retrieved from Compustat so that financial databases could be
used to collect variable information.
To be included in the sample the AAER must allege that revenues have been
manipulated. Feroz et al. (1991) found that over 70% of the AAERs in their investigation
consisted of overstatements of accounts receivable from premature revenue recognition and
overstatements of inventories from delayed write-offs. The income effects of these reporting
violations were more than 50% of reported income. In the sample used by Dechow et al. (1996),
40% overstated revenues, 7% delayed recognition of a loss, and 15.2% combined the
overstatement of revenues and the understatement of expenses.
For each of the firms in the sample, a control sample was obtained by the following
method used by Dechow et al. (1996).
1.

1

Determine the SEC firm’s total assets for the year-end prior to the first year of the
manipulation period.

2. Search the annual industrial and full coverage Compustat files for firms in the same
three-digit SIC industry that report assets in that year.
3. Select a control firm that minimized the absolute difference in assets. (9)
For both the revenue manipulating sample and for the control sample, financial data
was drawn from Compustat for the manipulation period and also for the two years before the
manipulation (when available) and two years after the manipulation (when available). This
additional time period provided an additional control sample.

1

An alternative method of obtaining a control sample would be to follow Kothari et al. (2005) who match
based on accruals.
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Research Design
Whether management will decrease discretionary expenditures when they include
fraudulently recorded revenues in their financial statements is modeled by a linear regression
framework. The model is used to estimate the coefficients and statistical significance of each
variable and is given below.
DISC_EXP =  +  ABN_CF +  ACCTCH +  AFT_MAN +
 BEF_MAN +  CL +  INVREC +  HASDEBT+
 MANIPULATOR +  MFG +  SIZE+  PREV_YR_CF_IND
+ 

Where:
DISC_EXP
ABNORMAL_CF
ACCTCH
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN

=
=
=
=
=

R&D plus SG&A plus advertising
Calculated as actual cash flows minus normal cash flows
Index ranging from 0 to 1 based on most
Time period is after the manipulation period (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Time period is before the manipulation period(1 if yes, 0
otherwise)

CL

=

Current liabilities at the beginning of the year scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year

INVREC

=

HASDEBT

=

The sum of the beginning of the year inventories and receivables
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year
Has long-term or short-term debt outstanding at the beginning of
of the year or at the end of the year (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Received an AAER for revenue manipulation(1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Firm belongs to manufacturing industry (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Natural log of MVE
Abnormally low cash flow in the previous year
(1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Error term

MANIPULATOR
=
MFG
=
SIZE
=
PREV_YR_CF_IND =








The dependent variable is the total discretionary expenditures. DISC_EXP is computed
as the total of R&D, SG&A, and advertising.
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Test Variables
The research question concerns the effect of fraudulent revenue manipulations
(MANIPULATOR) on discretionary expenditures. MANIPULATOR is coded one if the firm
received an AAER for revenue manipulation, zero otherwise. To further investigate the research
question a variable is included for the time period before manipulation, BEF_MAN, and after
manipulation, AFT_MAN. This allows the sample to be divided by time period.
Control Variables
Control variables are taken from Roychowdhury (2006) who examined whether firms
manipulate real activities through the use of discretionary expenditures. He found several factors
that affect discretionary expenditures and they are used as controls in this model. Controls were
also taken from Defond and Hung (2003) who investigated the characteristics of firms that
received a cash flow forecast. If firm receives a cash flow forecast, they would have an incentive
to manipulate cash flows which would have an effect on discretionary expenditures. Following
are descriptions of the control variables.
Abnormal cash flows (ABNORMAL_CF) is computed as the actual cash flows minus the
normal cash flows. The methodology developed by Dechow et al. (1998) will be used to
determine normal cash flows coefficients based on industry and year. Dechow et al. (1998)
expressed normal cash flows from operations as a linear function of sales and change in sales in
the current period. The following cross-sectional regression was run for every industry and
every year.
CFOt/At-1 = α0 + α₁(1/At-1) + β₁(St/At-1) + β₂(ΔSt/At-1) + ε
Where assets are equal to A and sales are equal to S.
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(2)

Following Roychowdhury (2006) 15 observations for each industry-year grouping were
required to run the regression. Using the coefficients from this regression, normal cash flows
were determined for each firm in the sample. Normal cash flows were then subtracted from the
actual cash flows reported by the firm.
Heterogeneous accounting choices (ACCTCH) are computed as an index ranging from 0
to 1 computed by assigning a value of 1 to each firm whose accounting choice differs from the
most frequently chosen method in the industry group of the firm for each of the following five
accounting choices: inventory valuation, investment tax credit, depreciation, successful efforts
vs. full-cost for companies with extraction activities and purchase vs. pooling. If a firm has no
information or a missing value, the choice is coded as zero. The score is summed and then
divided by the number of accounting choices for the industry; 5 for firms in petroleum and
natural gas; 3 for firms in banking, insurance, real estate, and trading; and 4 for all other firms.
Firms that make accounting choices that are different from the normal choices of the industry are
considered aggressive firms. These firms may also aggressively spend on discretionary accruals.
If a firm has higher current liabilities (CL) or debt (HASDEBT), cash flows may be higher sicne
they can use borrowed funds to spend on discretionary expenditures which may help in firm
growth. CL is measured as current liabilities at the beginning of the year divided by total assets
at the beginning of the year. HASDEBT is coded as 1 if a firm has debt either at the beginning
of the year or at the end of the year, 0 otherwise. INVREC is calculated as the beginning of the
year inventory and receivables scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. It is included
to show the effect of inventory and receivables levels on discretionary expenditures. A higher
level of inventory and accounts receivables may signify firms that are aggressively seeking
growth opportunities. They may also spend on discretionary expenditures as an opportunity to
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increase growth. Discretionary expenditures may be lower if the accounts receivable are higher
since there would be less cash recognized from revenue. Manufacturing firms (MFG) would be
expected to spend more on R&D, SG&A, and advertising because their growth may depend on
these expenditures. Size (SIZE) would also affect the level of cash flows since larger firms
would be expected to have more cash available from operations. SIZE is measured as the natural
log of the market value of equity. The presence of abnormally low cash flows in a previous year
(PREV_YR_CF_IND) may influence current cash flows since a firm could find difficulties in
bringing cash flows back to normal levels. This is an indicator variable coded as one if cash
flows in the previous year are abnormally low and zero otherwise. This calculation uses the
calculation for normal cash flows described above from Dechow et al. (1998).
Results
Table 9 presents a summary of the sample observations. There were 365 firms identified
as annual revenue manipulators. Complete information could not be found for 199 firms leaving
a sample of 163 firms. One firm had two separate periods of manipulations so there are 162
unique firms in the sample. There are 153 firms that had multiple year manipulations. This
increases the number of firm years during the manipulation period to 274 giving an average
manipulation period of 1.68 years. As an additional control, the sample also includes periods
that are two years before (if available) and two years after (if available) the manipulation period.
This increases the total firm years in the sample to 630.
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Table 9 - Summary of Sample Observations
Firms identified as annual revenue manipulators
Less: Firms with unavailable TIC symbol
Less: Firms with incomplete/unavailable data
Firms in final sample

365
(57)
(145)
163

Firms with multiple year manipulations
Firm years in final sample*
Firm years in manipulation period
Average number of years in manipulation period

153
630
274
1.68

*Includes data for two years before manipulation period (when available) and two years after
manipulation period (when available).

Table 10 provides the distribution of the sample by the first year of manipulation. The
period covered by the sample is from 1988 through 2005. The year with the highest number of
manipulating firms was 1997 with 23. The SEC found more revenue manipulating firms that
began the manipulations during the period from 1995 through 2001 with 107 of the 163 or 66%
of the firms beginning the manipulations of revenues during this period.
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Table 10 - Distribution of Sample by First Year of Manipulation

Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Firms
10
2
6
8
5
8
7
10
11
23
17
18
16
12
4
2
1
3

Percentage
by Year
6.1
1.2
3.7
5.0
3.1
5.0
4.3
6.1
6.8
14.1
10.4
11.0
9.8
7.3
2.5
1.2
0.6
1.8

163

100.0

Table 11 provides the distribution of the sample by industry. Forty-seven of the 163
firms (29%) are in the business services industry. Higher numbers of firms are also included in
chemicals and allied products (12), industrial machinery and equipment (17), and electronic and
other electric equipment (14). The average years of manipulation by industry range from one to
almost three years.
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Table 11 - Distribution of Sample by Industry

15
16
20
23
25
27
28
33
34
35
36
37
38
50
51
54
56
57
58
59
73
78
79
80
82
87

Industry
Firms
General Building Contractors
1
Heavy Construction, Except Building
1
Food and Kindred Products
4
Apparel and Other Textile Products
4
Furniture and Fixtures
1
Printing and Publishing
2
Chemicals and Allied Products
12
Primary Metal Industries
1
Fabricated Metal Products
3
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
17
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
14
Transportation Equipment
2
Instruments and Related Products
14
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods
8
Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods
8
Food Stores
3
Apparel and Accessory Stores
2
Furniture and Home Furnishings Stores
1
Eating and Drinking Places
1
Miscellaneous Retail
3
Business Services
47
Motion Pictures
1
Amusement and Recreation Services
4
Health Services
5
Educational Services
1
Engineering & Management Services
3
Total
163

% of
Number of
Average
Firms by
Years in
Years of
Industry Manipulation Manipulation
Period
0.6
2.00
2
0.6
1.00
1
2.5
2.50
10
2.5
1.75
7
0.6
2.00
2
1.2
2.00
4
7.4
1.67
20
0.6
2.00
2
1.8
1.00
3
10.4
1.35
23
8.6
1.57
22
1.2
1.00
2
8.6
1.71
24
5.0
1.38
11
5.0
2.38
19
1.8
2.00
6
1.2
1.00
2
0.6
1.00
1
0.6
2.00
2
1.8
1.67
5
28.8
1.68
79
0.6
1.00
1
2.5
2.00
8
3.1
2.80
14
0.6
1.00
1
1.8
1.00
3
100.0
274

Table 12 presents (untransformed) descriptive statistics for all variables in the linear
regression model for the full sample of revenue manipulating firms and control firms. The
minimum discretionary expenditures are 0.00 with a maximum of 25,253.57, and a mean of
746.14. Abnormal cash flows have a minimum of -7,149.14, a maximum of 7,769.75, a median
of 1.05, and a mean of 77.24. Accounting choices has a mean of 0.09, a minimum of 0.00, a
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median of 0.00, and a maximum of 0.50. The mean for current liabilities is 0.24 with a
minimum of 0, a median of 0.21, and a maximum of 3.41. Eighty-eight percent have debt, and
45% of the firms are manufacturing firms. Size, the natural log of the market value of equity,
has a minimum of -1.90 and a maximum of 12.20 with a mean of 5.51 and a median of 5.28.
Forty-four percent of the firms have cash flows that are abnormally low in the previous year.
Table 12 - Descriptive Statistics (n = 1260)

Variable
DISC_EXP
ABNORMAL_CF
ACCTCH
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN

Mean
Minimum
746.14
0.00
77.24
-7149.19
0.09
0.00
0.38
0.00
0.18
0.00
CL
0.24
0.00
INVREC
0.35
0.00
HASDEBT
0.88
0.00
MANIPULATOR
0.50
0.00
MFG
0.45
0.00
SIZE
5.51
-1.90
PREV_YR_CF_IND
0.44
0.00

Median
54.56
1.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.33
1.00
1.00
0.00
5.28
0.00

Std.
Maximum Deviation
25253.57
2484.84
7769.75
680.71
0.50
0.14
1.00
0.49
1.00
0.39
3.41
0.18.
0.91
0.21.
1.00
0.32
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.50
12.20
2.47
1.00
0.50

Univariate statistics in Table 13 contain means for the firms that received an AAER for
revenue manipulation compared to firms that have not received an AAER for manipulating
revenues. Chi-square test statistics indicate significant differences in frequencies between
groups for firms that have abnormally low cash flows in the previous year (p = 0.002) and for
firms that have debt (p < 0.001). T-test statistics indicate significant differences between the
groups for size (p = 0.008), for abnormally low cash flows (0.018), and for accounting choices
(0.001).
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Table 13 – Univariate Statistics

Variable
DISC_EXP
ABNORMAL_CF
ACCTCH
CL

INVREC
HASDEBT
SIZE
PREV_YR_CF_IND
Observations

Mean for firms Mean for firms Chireceiving an receiving no Square/ P-value
AAER for
AAER for
t(t- statistic
revenue
revenue
statistic p-value
manipulation manipulation (bolded) bolded)
706.71
785.64
0.56
0.573
31.94
122.61
2.237
0.018
0.08
0.11
3.25
0.001
0.23
0..24
1.033
0.302
0.35
0.35
-0434
0.664
0.93
0.84
17.023
<0.0001
5.70
5.33
-2.650
0.008
0.51
0.36
9.751
0.002
630
630

Note: Chi-square tests are performed for dichotomous variables. All others are
t-tests with the results bolded.

Multicollinearity is considered by analyzing Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all
variables that appear in the model (Table 14). Most of the correlations are low. There is a
correlation between CL and HASDEBT (0.9078) which indicates that firms that have high
current liabilities also have debt. This is expected since current liabilities are included in the
determination of HASDEBT. There is a correlation between MANIPULATOR and MFG
(0.9796). This is expected since 286 of the 630 firms that are manipulators are manufacturers.
There is also a correlation between MFG and SIZE as expected. Manufacturing firms are
generally larger firms. The correlation between CL and Abnormal_CF is (0.7122). Firms with
larger current liabilities would have abnormally low cash flows since the liability for current
liabilities requires the payment of future cash flows on a short term basis.
HIGH_RISK and RISK_PORTFOLIO (0.772), two control variables, which indicates
that high-risk auditees appear in risky auditor portfolios, as expected. To investigate the possible
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effects of this collinearity, sensitivity tests, as described in the next section, are performed. The
correlation between GOVT and CLIENTS (0.718) is expected as some state auditors perform a
majority of county audits for their respective states.
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Table 14 - Pearson Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models (n = 1260)
Variable
(1) DISC_EXP
(2) ABNORMAL_CF

(1)
1.000

0..366
(0.000)
(3) ACCTCH
0.207
(0.000)
(4) AFT_MAN
0.004
(0.8875)
(5) BEF_MAN
-0.013
(0.637)
(6) CL
0.040
(0157)
(7) INVREC
-0.079
(0.005)
(8) HASDEBT
0.090
(0.001)
(9) MANIPULATOR
-0.016
(0.572)
(10) MFG
0.100
(0.000)
(11) SIZE
0.531
(0.000)
(12) PREV_YR_CF_IND
-0.097
(0.000)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

1.000
0.072
(0.010)
-0.0273
(0.333)
0.007
(0.798)
-0.0103
(0.712)
-0.095
(0.001)
0.041
(0.147)
-0.066
(0.018)
0.142
(0.000)
0.232
(0.000)
-0.160
(0.000)

1.000
-0.019
(0.493)
0.022
(0.433)
-0.058
(0.039)
0.048
(0.089)
0.032
(0.258)
-0.091
0.001
0.053
(0.056)
0.054
(0.055)
-0.057
(0.041)

1.000
-0.372
(0.000)
0.092
(0.001)
-0.031
(0.267)
-0.015
(0.592)
-0.001
(0.982)
0.060
(0.032)
-0.003
(0.901)
0.105
((0.000)

1.000
-0.023
(.0416)
0.066
(0.012)
0.010
(0.730)
0.002
(0.952)
-0.033
(0.248)
-0.056
(0.045)
-0.058
(0.041)
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1.000
0.203
((0.000)
-0.003
(0.908)
-0.030
(0.291)
-0.068
(0.015)
-0.073
(0.009)
0.078
(0.005)

1.000
0.115
(0.000)
0.012
(0.673)
0.184
(0.000)
-0.304
(0.000)
0.150
(0.000)

1.000
0.139
(0.000)
0.096
((0.001)
0.038
(0.178)
-0.006
(0.815

1.000
-0.001
(0.980)
0.074
(0.009)
0.150
(0.000)

1.000
0.010
(0.712)
-0.053
(0.060)

1.000
-0.137
(0.000)

1.000

Table 15 presents the results of four different linear regressions. The first model uses the
full sample of firms (1260). This sample includes all firm years including the manipulation
period, a period before the manipulation period, and a period after the manipulation period.
Controls, BEF_MAN and AFT_MAN, are included for the periods before and after the
manipulation period. The R² for the model (.388) indicates a reasonable amount of variation left
unexplained. The variable of interest, MANIPULATOR (p = 0.210) is not significant in this
model indicating that a firm’s fraudulent manipulation of revenues does not have an effect on
discretionary expenditures. This supports the sticky costs research that shows that discretionary
expenditures can be difficult to decrease in the short term. ABNORMAL_CF has an effect on
discretionary accruals (<.0001), but the coefficient is small and positive. The expectation is that
the sign of the coefficient would be negative. If cash flows are low, discretionary expenditures
should be lower. Surprisingly, PREV_YR_CF_IND does not have an effect on the level of
discretionary expenditures (0.666). ACCTCH is significant in determining discretionary
expenditures (<.0001), and the sign on the coefficient is positive as expected. These firms are
considered aggressive since they are making accounting choices that are different from other
firms in the industry. It is expected that they would aggressively spend more on discretionary
expenditures. The control variables for the periods before and after the manipulation period are
not significant to the model. This indicates that there are no changes between the periods. CL
and INVREC both have a significant, positive effect on discretionary expenditures (p = 0.001
and 0.030, respectively). HASDEBT is significant (0.024) and has a positive coefficient as
expected. MFG and SIZE are both significant (0.065 and <.0001, respectively) with expected
positive signs.
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To further investigate the relationship between the variables and abnormally low cash
flows, the reduced models are also presented in Table 7 and separate the sample into time
periods. The reduced samples include firm years for the period of the manipulation, the period
before the manipulation, and the period after the manipulation.
The R2 is lower for the model that includes the sample for the manipulation period thus
explaining less variation, but the models for the period before the manipulation and after the
manipulation compare favorably with the model including the full sample. ABNORMAL_CF is
significant in all three reduced models with positive, but small coefficients. ACCTCH is not
significant in the model for the manipulation period, but is significant in the other models. CL is
significant in all of the models except for the one for the period before the manipulation.
INVREC is only significant in the model for the period after manipulation. HASDEBT is not
significant in any of the other models even though it is significant for the model for the full
sample. MANIPULATOR is not significant in any of the models. Manufacturing is significant
is the model for the period of the manipulation. Size is significant in all periods.
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Table 15 - Linear Regression Results DISC_EXP =  +  ABNORMAL_ CF +  ACCTCH +  AFT_MAN +
 BEF_MAN +  CL +  INVREC +  HASDEBT +
 MANIPULATOR + β9MFG + β10SIZE + β11PREV_YR_CF_IND

Expected
Sign
Variable
Intercept
ABNORMAL_CF
ACCTCH
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN
CL

INVREC
HASDEBT
MANIPULATOR
MFG
SIZE
PREV_YR_CF_IND
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2

?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
-

Full
Model
Parameter
Estimate
-3215.092
0.870
2823.288
60.262
85.58
1018.822
637.555
398.711
-142.629
213.840
494.595
50.188

Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced
Reduced
Reduced
Model
Model
Model
Model Model After Model
Manip.
Manip.
Before
Before
Manip.
After
Parameter
Period
Period
Manip. Manip.
Manip.
Full Model Parameter P-Value Parameter P-Value
Estimate
P-Value
P-value
Estimate
Estimate
<.0001 -2180.782
<.0001 -3152.404
<.0001
-3549.549
<.0001
<.0001
1.054
<.0001
0.426
0.014
0.924
<.0001
<.0001
344.76
0.594
3311.222
<.0001
2293.309
0.001
0.625
0.579
0.001
1267.195
0.072
1672.792
0.145
968.291
0.014
0.030
412.051
0.408
142.609
0.850
834.498
0.098
0.024
375.140
0.192
505.946
0.225
395.512
0.190
0.210
-32.862
0.862
-43.572
0.867
-201.549
0.317
0.065
416.918
0.029
198.920
0.452
42.601
0.832
<.0001
334.977
<.0001
464.162
<.0001
575.695
<.0001
0.666
1.269
0.995
240.870
0.379
160.007
0.432
1260
548
228
484
0.388
0.281
0.360
0.363
0.383
0.269
0.334
0.351
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Sensitivity Analysis
Two different regressions were used in sensitivity analysis. In these two regressions
abnormal discretionary expenditures were calculated and used as the dependent variable.
Roychowdhury (2006) expressed discretionary expenses as a linear function of sales and used
the following regression:
DISEXPt/At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/ At-1 ) + β(St / A t-1 ) + εt

(3)

As stated by Roychowdury (2006), “if firms manage earnings upward to increase

reported earnings in any year, they can exhibit unusually low residuals from the above regression

in that year, even when they do not reduce discretionary expenses. To avoid this problem,
discretionary expenses are expressed as a function of lagged sales.” (p. 345) In order to estimate

the normal discretionary expenses, the following regression was run for every industry and year.

DISEXPt/A t-1 = α0 + α1 (1/ At-1 ) + β(St-1 / A t-1 ) + εt

(4)

Normal discretionary expenses for each firm were determined using the coefficients from the
above equation based on industry and year. Normal discretionary expenses were subtracted from
the actual discretionary expenses to determine abnormal discretionary expenses. The first
regression used this continuous variable as the dependent variable in a linear regression. The R2
low for this regression (0.12) and MANIPULATOR was not significant. The second regression
used an indicator variable for discretionary expenses in a logistic regression. Discretionary
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expenditures were coded as 1 if they were abnormally low and 0 otherwise. The R2 in this
regression was also very low (0.03) and MANIPULATOR was not significant.
Summary and Conclusions
Firms that manipulate revenues may have an incentive to manage cash flows in order to
hide their fraudulent manipulations. Auditors, investors, and creditors will try to determine if
cash flows from operations align with revenues by computing an expected level of cash flows.
When revenues are fraudulently manipulated, revenues increase but cash flows will not have the
same increase because the cash will not be realized. Managers have an opportunity to hide their
manipulative activities and align the cash flows from operations with revenues by decreasing
discretionary expenditures. This method of increasing cash flows should be efficient and
effective. Previous research has shown that managers do use discretionary expenditures to reach
short term goals such as meeting earnings targets and reported margins. While this theory shows
promise concerning the acts that managers will use to manage cash flows to meet projections, a
competing theory has been presented in research that shows that discretionary expenditures may
not be easy to manage in the short term. This theory posits that discretionary expenditures are
“sticky” and hard to decrease quickly. This is because there are costs associated with decreasing
discretionary expenditures. Some of these costs are out-of-pocket and relate to severance pay for
employees that must be fired and the cost of training for employees that are rehired and trained
when production returns to previous levels. Other costs are caused by personal considerations of
management. They may not want to lose status because of downsizing, or they may feel anguish
about firing familiar employees.
The results of the current study do not support the theory that management will adjust
discretionary expense in order to conceal revenue manipulations. In this study discretionary
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expenditures are not decreased when firms fraudulently manipulate revenues. This may suggest
that management may find it difficult to adjust discretionary spending quickly. Future research
can investigate this theory.
As with all research, there are limitations in to this study. One limitation of this study is
the use of AAERs to obtain the sample. The use of AAERs results in the use of a smaller sample
than the samples found in other research, but this study includes a larger sample than most
published studies using AAERs. The use of AAERs may also reduce the generalizability of the
results to other entities. The SEC investigates manipulations that are economically significant
and this may mean that the firms in the sample consist of larger firms.
Another limitation of the study is that the model leaves a significant amount of variation
unexplained. Future research can determine other variables that could provide further insight
into the variation in discretionary expenditures. When the sample is divided by time period, the
model fit for the time period of the manipulation is not as good as for the entire sample or for the
periods before and after the manipulation. Other variables that explain the variation in
discretionary expenditures during the time of the manipulation can be determined in future
research.
Future research may also look at factors other than discretionary expenditures that may
be used to manage cash flows to hide the revenue manipulations. Anecdotal information has
included methods that have been reported by the investment community to warn investors of
possible cash flow management. These include dishonesty in accounts payable, selling of
accounts receivables (securitization), and questionable capitalization of expenses. Future
research may investigate these methods and their association with cash flow management and
fraudulent behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASSET SALES AND REVENUE MANIPULATIONS
Abstract
This study investigates whether firms that manipulate revenues will also sell assets to
divert attention from the revenue manipulation. Two theories concerning asset sales have been
presented in prior research. Initial research posited that there was value creation for the buyer
and seller as a result of asset sales. Later research has looked at the incentives that cause
management to unexpectedly sell significant assets and hypothesizes that management does not
want to sell assets. Management is forced to sell assets because of the occurrence of negative
events.
Widely accepted theory states that management sells assets to allocate resources between
firms efficiently. An alternative theory, the financing hypothesis, suggests that managers sell
assets because of an event. When firms manipulate revenues, they have created an event. They
may manipulate revenues because they are poor performers, need to pay down debt, or meet loan
covenant requirements. In addition to these problems, the manipulation of revenues may cause
management to sell assets. This paper investigates whether firms that manipulate revenues are
more likely to make significant asset sales that are unexpected. This would provide support for
the financing hypothesis, and the empirical results are positive. The logistic regression shows
that the manipulation of revenues significantly increases the likelihood that a firm will sell
assets.
While this study is an exploratory study and provides a beginning for analysis, the
findings are limited by the small sample size. Asset sales research tends to have small sample
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sizes, but the sample size for this study could be increased by looking at other types of financial
statement fraud in addition to revenue manipulations.
The results of this study provide an opening to further investigate an association between
sales and financial statement fraud.

80

Introduction
The focus of this research study is on the relationship between asset sales and fraudulent
revenue manipulations. Even though considerable research has focused on the asset sale area,
this research has not generally focused on asset sales that are significant and unanticipated. This
type of asset sale may occur when management has an incentive to sale assets that are
unexpected and outside normal business practices. Management’s manipulation of revenues
could provide the incentive to make a significant sale. The objective of this study is to
investigate whether firms that manipulate revenues will sell assets to divert attention from the
revenue manipulation and other firm issues that result from the manipulation.
Prior research investigating asset sales has focused on value creation for the buyer and
seller. There are two different theories about why firm sell assets. The first theory is the
efficient deployment hypothesis theory. This theory assumes that management wants to
maximize shareholder wealth by allocating assets to users who can better manage the assets.
Managers will only retain assets when they have a comparative advantage, and they will sell the
assets as soon as they recognize that another firm may be better able to more efficiently manage
the assets. Thus there are gains to both the buyer and the seller. Research has substantiated this
theory (Hite et al. 1987; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). Datta et al. (2003) added findings to
this area of research when they found that gains of the buyers and sellers are affected by the
management performance of each firm. For example, they suggest that the market views wellmanaged sellers as better able to use the proceeds from asset sales than sellers that are poorly
managed.
The second theory is the financing hypothesis developed by Lang et al. (1995). This
theory states that management is reluctant to sell assets for efficiency because they value firm
size and control. If this is the case, management must have a more compelling reason to sell
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assets. One compelling reason that has been suggested in prior research is the provision of a
source of financing when other sources are too expensive or when equity sales are unattractive.
Another reason may be that assets may be sold because of a financial situation. These firms may
be poor performers or they may have high leverage. Research by Lang et al. (1995) upheld these
suggestions, and other research has provided support.
Brown et al. (1994) looked at asset sales for distressed firms. They found that the
probability of an asset sale rises as the proportion of short-term bank debt in the firm’s capital
structure rises and as the selling firm’s investment opportunities decrease. They also found that
the sales proceeds are more likely to be paid out to creditors as opposed to being retained by the
firm, and that creditors have a significant influence on the liquidation decisions of distressed or
poor performing firms.
The current study uses a sample of firms that have fraudulently manipulated revenues.
Previous research has found that these firms may be poor performers (Feroz et al. 1991). They
may also manipulate their financial statements in order to obtain external financing at a lower
cost or to avoid debt covenant restrictions (Dechow et al. 1996). Later research by Dechow et al.
(2011) found that even though the firms may show strong performance in the years before the
manipulation, their performance has begun to moderate. Whether the firms are already poor
performers or management knows that their performance will not be maintained, managers have
made a decision to manipulate the financial statements, and they don’t want the manipulation to
be discovered.
Auditors, investors, regulators, and creditors have opportunities to discover the
manipulation of revenues. Cash flows may be less than expected. Performance measures such
as operating income and net income may be declining. The cost of debt and equity may be rising
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as firms struggle to pay debt and meet debt covenants. Following the financing hypothesis,
management may be motivated to sell assets to divert attention from the revenue manipulation
which is the subject of the current research. The results of the study show a positive association
between asset sales and fraudulent revenue manipulations.
Based on the logistic regression used in the study, the probability that a firm will sell
assets increases significantly when a firm fraudulently manipulates revenues. One limitation of
this study is the small sample size. Sample sizes for asset sales research tend to be small. For
example, the sample size for Lang et al. (1995) was 93 and the sample of selling firms in Datta et
al. (2003) was 113. The current study had data collection limitations that further limited the
sample size. To be included in the sample, the firm must have received an Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) for fraudulently manipulating revenues. AAERs are issued for different types of fraud,
and revenue manipulations are a sub-sample of all AAERs. While the use of AAERs provides a
sample of known revenue manipulators that have significantly altered their financial statements,
the sample sizes used in the AAER studies are generally small especially when using a subsample. The current study further divides the sample to obtain revenue manipulators that also
sell assets. This limits the use of the results of the study but the findings can be used as a basis
for further study. The descriptive statistics show that firms more often sell assets in the two
years following the manipulation. This suggests that management may believe that performance
will improve and they will not need to manipulate revenues in the future. This also supports the
financing hypothesis of asset sales. Managers do value firm size and must have another
incentive to sell assets. Univariate statistics show that the firms in the manipulation sample have
higher debt than the control sample. This also supports the financing hypothesis that states that
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management is looking for a source of financing that is cheaper than external financing.
Performance measures such as Tobin’s Q are not significantly different from the control sample.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
background of SEC Enforcement Actions. The third section includes prior research and the
development of the hypothesis. The fifth section describes the methodology. The sixth section
reports the empirical results and discussion. The final section includes the summary and
concluding remarks.
Background of SEC Enforcement Actions
Firms that have been issued an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER)
by the SEC are used as the sample for this study. SEC enforcement actions are taken against
firms that are identified as having violated the financial reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC obtains leads for investigation from several sources: (1) public
complaints and tips; (2) the reporting requirements of federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies under the Bank Secrecy Act; (3) the enforcement staff of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board; (4) the enforcement of “blue sky laws” by state securities
regulators; (5) complaints and other information from members of Congress on behalf of
constituents whom they represent; (6) trading related referrals from domestic self-regulatory
organizations (SROS); (7) and their own examinations of financial statements (SEC, 2010b).
SEC staff members from the Division of Corporation Finance examine financial
statements and other filings for routine screening criteria violations and for suspicious subjective
factors. If a firm is suspected of fraudulent activity because of screening or because of a tip from
another source, the firm is investigated. When the initial investigation exposes factors that
warrant further investigation, an informal investigation is conducted, and persons with relevant
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information are invited to provide pertinent documents and testimony. The SEC need not
formally notify the target firm during this investigation, thus protecting firms that will be cleared
by the informal investigation. If strong evidence of a securities law violation is uncovered
during the informal investigation, the SEC may pursue a formal investigation. The formal
investigation grants subpoena power to compel testimony and the production of documents. If
the SEC informs the target of the formal investigation, the 1934 Act Release No. 5092 requires
disclosure to shareholders by the firm, and the investigation may become public. The SEC
policy is to make its enforcement activities public only when it files a formal complaint alleging
securities law violations and seeks settlement with the enforcement target.
According to the SEC enforcement manual dated January 13, 2010 which includes
conforming revisions as of March 3, 2010, (SEC 2010b) the SEC ranks investigations and
allocates resources to them based on the listings and rankings of associate directors and regional
directors who list their top ten investigations and rank their top three investigations. These
rankings are based on three factors, the programmatic importance of an enforcement action; the
magnitude of potential violations; and the resources required to investigate the potential
violations. Feroz et al. (1991) point out that the SEC ranks a target according to the probability
of success since there are more targets for investigation than the SEC can practically pursue, and
since the investigations are both costly and highly visible. Of the firms that were investigated
formally in 2009, 94% were resolved in favor of the SEC (SEC 2010a, p. 30).
Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
There are two alternative theories concerning why firms sell assets. The first is the
efficient deployment hypothesis and the second is the financing hypothesis.
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The efficient deployment hypothesis theory assumes that management seeks to maximize
shareholder wealth by selling assets. The results of research in this area promote the idea that
asset sales promote efficiency by allocating assets to better users, thus sellers also gain from the
transaction. Hite et al. (1987) found that both buyers and sellers have statistically significant
abnormal returns from partial sell-offs. They interpret their results as evidence that the assets are
shifted to users who can more effectively manage the assets to realize gain for the firm.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) also promote this theory. They analyzed the market for
corporate assets to determine who engaged in asset sales and mergers and if there was an
efficiency gain. They posit that the probability of asset sales is associated with the organization
of the firm and the efficiency of the buyer and seller after the transaction. They looked at the
timing of the transactions and the pattern of efficiency gains and found that the sales tend to
improve the allocation of resources. This is consistent with a model of profit maximization by
both firms. This research helps to develop the theory that managers only retain assets when they
have a comparative advantage, and they will sell the assets as soon as they recognize that another
firm may be better able to more efficiently manage the assets. Datta et al. (2003) provide further
explanations of the gains realized by buying and selling firms. They find that seller gains are
affected by management performance. They suggest that the market views well-managed sellers
as better able to use the proceeds from asset sales than sellers that are poorly managed.
The second theory is the financing hypothesis developed by Lang et al. (1995) which
provides an alternative explanation of asset sales. This theory is based on the theory that
management will be reluctant to sell assets for efficiency alone since they value firm size and
control. In this case, management must have another, more compelling motivation to sell assets.
Asset sales may provide a source of funds when alternative sources of financing are too
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expensive or when equity sales are unattractive. Management may need to “raise funds to reduce
financial distress costs, to pay dividends to shareholders to prevent a takeover, or to undertake
investments that it values but shareholders do not” (Lang et al. 1995, 5). Management may find
this source of funding preferable to capital markets in spite of high transaction costs. Their
findings show that firms that sell assets tend to be poor performers, or they may have high
leverage. This suggests that a firm that sells assets may do so because of a financial situation
rather than a discovery of some other firm that can manage the assets more effectively.
Research by Brown et al. (1994) lends validity to this theory. In a study of distressed
firms, they found that sales proceeds are more likely to be paid out to creditors as opposed to
being retained by the firm. They also found the probability of an asset sale rises as the
proportion of short-term bank debt in the firm’s capital structure rises and as the selling firm’s
investment opportunities decrease. Their results further showed that creditors have a significant
influence on the liquidation decisions of distressed or poor performing firms.
In a study of firms that received an AAER, Feroz et al.(1991) found that firms that were
subject to enforcement actions were poor performers in the years prior to the disclosure. This
poor performance would have led to higher costs of equity. Dechow et al. (1996), who also used
a sample of firms that received an AAER, found that an important incentive for management to
manipulate earnings was to obtain external financing at a lower cost. They also found that
management wanted to avoid debt covenant restrictions. In later work using a larger sample of
firms that received an AAER, Dechow et al. (2011) found that firms had shown a strong
performance prior to manipulating their financial statements, but their financial performance had
started to moderate. Management knew of the decline even though the firm may have appeared
to stakeholders to be performing well. Managers wanted to hide this decline in performance.
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They also found that cash profit margins and earnings growth declined during the manipulation
years.
The sample of the current study consists of firms that have received an AAER for
revenue manipulation. Management of these firms had a reason for increasing earnings by
committing fraud. This may have included poor or declining performance, high cost of debt and
equity, debt covenant restrictions, or declining cash margins. Given that they have incentives to
manipulate revenues and following the financing hypothesis of Lang et al. (1995), management
would also have incentives to sell assets. First, revenues are being manipulated but cash flows
from operations are not following this rise in income. The cost of debt and equity may be rising.
The funds from an asset sale could be used to pay debt, meet debt covenants, or increase cash
margins. Second, management knows that performance is declining, and they know that the
market may recognize this decline in the near future. Alexander et al. (1984), Hite et al. (1987),
and Jain (1985) found significant average abnormal returns when a firm sells assets. The asset
sale could be a signal to the market that management is attempting to improve performance by
allocating assets more efficiently. This leads to the following hypothesis.
H1: Firms that commit fraudulent revenue manipulations are more likely to sell assets
than firms that do not commit fraudulent revenue manipulations.
Methodology
Sample Selection
The sample for this study is selected from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs) issued by the SEC. There are alternative sources for identifying financial
statement manipulators such as the GAO Financial Statement Restatement Database or the
Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits. The GAO database consists of a large number
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of restatements, and a restatement is included even if the reason for the restatement is immaterial
and does not have economic significance. There also may not have been managerial intent to
commit a fraudulent act. The GAO database also only identifies the year that the restatement
was identified in the press. This would not provide information about the period of time that the
firm manipulated the financial statements. The Stanford Law Database on Shareholder Lawsuits
reports shareholder lawsuits which may typically arise from material intentional manipulations,
but it also would include lawsuits that are brought for reasons that are unrelated to financial
manipulations. The sample of the current study must be made up of firms that have issued
financial statements that include GAAP violations concerning revenue manipulations that are
economically significant and were made with the intent of misleading investors. The SEC issues
an AAER only when there has been a significant financial statement manipulation and
management has the intent to commit fraud.
Enforcement actions and investigations are brought by the SEC pursuant to Section 13(a)
of the Securities Act of 1934 in which the Commission alleges that the firm has overstated
earnings in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Under Section
13(a), firms whose securities are registered with the SEC must file reports that are required by
the SEC including quarterly and annual financial statements. These statements must comply
with Regulation S-X which requires conformity with GAAP.
The SEC investigates firms that may be in violation of SEC and federal rules, and they
may take action against firms, auditors, management, and other parties that are involved in the
violations. According to Dechow et al. (2011), the SEC checks for compliance with GAAP by
reviewing about one-third of the financial statements issued by public companies each year.
Dechow et al. (1996) identify other sources that may lead to an investigation including
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anonymous tips from employees, insiders, journalists, and analysts, and voluntary restatements
by the firm itself. If they believe that there is an inconsistency with GAAP in the financial
statements, they can initiate an informal inquiry and gather additional information. The SEC
may drop the case after this informal investigation, or they may take further steps which may
lead to enforcement actions. This may include the issuance of an AAER as well as requiring the
firm to pay damages, restate financial statements, or change accounting methods.
The sample in the current study consists of firms that received an AAER for manipulating
annual financial statements and excludes those firms that manipulated quarterly earnings. Also
excluded from the sample were firms in regulated industries (SIC codes between 4400 and 5000)
and banks and financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6500). This follows prior
research.
The sample was taken from two sources. The first source is a database developed by
Dechow et al. (2011) of firms that includes information from a review of AAERS from the SEC
website. The second source is provided by an examination of the individual AAERs issues by
the SEC.
Dechow et al. (2011) compiled a database of information from 2,191 AAERs issued by
the SEC from May 17th, 1982 through June 10th, 2005. This database includes three files: the
Detail, Annual, and Quarterly files. The Detail file provides firm identifiers, a description of
why the AAER was issued, and the balance sheet and income statement accounts that are
affected. The Annual and Quarterly files are compiled from the Detail file and are formatted by
reporting period so the information can be matched to financial databases such as Compustat and
CRSP. This database includes all of the AAERS issued during a specific period of time, but the
current study is an investigation of only revenue manipulating firms. To obtain a sample of

90

firms that manipulate revenues, the database was sorted based on the reason for the AAER, the
accounts that were affected, and the year(s) of the manipulation. This database includes
information on AAERs beginning in 1982. The sample can only include firms that manipulated
revenues after 1986 since the study investigates the relationship between revenue manipulation
and operating cash flows. Data on operating cash flows is available on Compustat only after
1986. From the 2,191 AAERs included in the database, 307 individual firms were identified as
annual revenue manipulators after 1984.
The second source for the sample was the AAERs issued by the SEC. To extend the
sample, 913 individual AAERS were examined appropriate information was hand collected. In
order to assure that information collected and decisions made during the collection process were
the same for this sample in comparison to the database from Dechow et al. (2011), a sample of
AAERs for 33 different firms that were included in the Dechow database were reviewed and
information collected. The information collected was identical to the information from the
Dechow database.
As the SEC investigates and sanctions firms, multiple AAERS may be issued for a single
firm, and action may be taken against various parties associated with the firm. Dechow et al.
(2011) report that of the 2,191 AAERs included in their database, “the SEC took action against
2,592 different parties” (p. 15) including officers of the company, the firm itself, the auditor, the
attorney, and other parties such as consultants and investment bankers. Several AAERs may be
issued for the same firm with different information provided in each AAER. AAERs are not in a
standard format and the information provided will depend on who writes the AAER. The
information includes details about each case and the resultant sanctions and penalties that result
from the investigation. Conflicting information, such as the time period of the violation, may be
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found in different AAERs. This information must be investigated to determine the correct data.
An examination of the Dechow database provided guidance about gathering the appropriate data.
AAERs are issued for a variety of different financial statement manipulations. For
example, major enforcement cases in 2009 included actions involving subprime-related
securities, actions involving auction rate securities, actions involving offering frauds/Ponzi
schemes, actions involving broker-dealers, actions involving mutual funds and investment
advisers, actions involving financial fraud and issuer disclosure, and actions involving insider
trading (SEC, 2010a). The focus of the current study will be on those actions that involve
financial statement fraud through fraudulent revenue manipulation.
Following Dechow et al. (2011) each of the 913 AAERs from June 10th, 2005 through
January 19th, 2010 was separately examined to determine whether a GAAP violation involving
an annual revenue manipulation was involved. When a firm was identified as an annual revenue
manipulator, the reporting periods were identified. AAERs do not provide information about
company identifiers. These were retrieved from Compustat so that financial databases could be
used to collect variable information.
The sample of revenue manipulators was used to find a sample of firms that sold assets
other than in the normal course of business. To investigate whether a firm had sold assets, 8Ks
were reviewed individually for each firm in the sample of revenue manipulators. This follows
Lang et al. (1995). The 8Ks were reviewed for the period of the manipulation, the two year
period before the manipulation, and the two year period after the manipulation. Asset sales
reported on the 8K were used for this study since the 8Ks reported to the SEC must be both
significant and unanticipated. The form 8K requires the firm to furnish specific information if
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the firm or any of its majority-owned subsidiaries acquired or disposed of a significant amount of
assets other than in the ordinary course of business.
For each of the firms in the sample, a control sample was obtained by the following
method used by Dechow et al. (1996).
1.

1

Determine the SEC firm’s total assets for the year-end prior to the first year of the
manipulation period.

2. Search the annual industrial and full coverage Compustat files for firms in the same
three-digit SIC industry that report assets in that year.
3. Select a control firm that minimized the absolute difference in assets. (p. 9)
For the revenue manipulating sample and for the control sample, financial information
was taken from Compustat for the manipulation period and also for the two years before the
manipulation (when available) and two years after the manipulation (when available). This
additional time period provided an additional control sample.
Research Design
A logistic regression framework is used to model the probability that asset sales are more
probable when revenues are manipulated. Logistic regression is used to predict the probability
of an event occurrence. Using a dichotomous dependent variable, this study predicts the
probability of whether asset sales occur with a set of chosen independent variables. The
dependent variable is expected to be nonlinear with one or more of the independent variables.
Probabilities lie between 0 and 1 with 0.5 as the value in which both outcomes are equally likely.
Prior research historically uses logistic models for qualitative dependent variables.
1

An alternative method of obtaining a control sample would be to follow Kothari et al. (2005) who match
based on accruals.
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The logistic regression model is used to estimate the coefficients and statistical
significance of each variable and is given below:
ASSET_SALES =  +  SIZE +  AFT_MAN +  BEF_MAN +
 MANIPULATOR +  DEBT +  INT_COVERAGE +  NI +
 CL +  TOBINS_Q + 
Where:
ASSET_SALES
SIZE
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN

=
=
=
=

MANIPULATOR

=

DEBT
INT_COVERAGE
NI
CL

=
=
=
=

TOBINS_Q

=









Significant asset sale (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Natural log of MVE
Time period is after the manipulation period (1 if yes, 0 otherwise)
Time period is before the manipulation period (1 if yes, 0
otherwise)
Received an AAER for revenue manipulation (1 if yes, 0
otherwise)
Long-term debt plus short term debt divided by total assets
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest payments
Net income divided by total assets
Current liabilities at the beginning of the year scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the year

The book value of assets plus the difference between the market
value of equity and the book value of equity divided by the book
value of assets
Error term

The dependent variable is the presence of an asset sale. ASSET_SALE is coded 1 if a
firm has an asset sale during the manipulation period or in the period two years before or two
years after the manipulation period, 0 otherwise.
Based on theory and prior literature the following variables are included in the model, but
other unknown variables may be determining factors that affect asset sales.
Test Variables
The hypothesis tests whether a firm receiving an AAER for revenue manipulation,
MANIPULATION, is associated with having a significant, unexpected asset sale. The study also
investigates the time period that an asset sale might occur for a manipulating firm. Control
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variables are included for the two year period before the manipulation period, BEF_MAN, and
the two year period after the manipulation period, AFT_MAN.
Control Variables
Control variables are taken from Lang et al. (1995) who examined events that might
precipitate an asset sale. Following are descriptions of the control variables.
SIZE is measured as the natural log of the market value of equity. Larger firms may sell
assets to promote efficiencies by allocating assets to better users. Three leverage characteristics,
DEBT, CL, and INT_COVERAGE are included as control variables. DEBT is calculated as
long-term debt plus short-term debt divided by total assets. Prior research has found that firms
that sell assets may be poor performers and unable to obtain financing from outside sources.
Selling assets provides funding for operations or growth opportunities. CL is determined by
dividing current liabilities at the beginning of the year by total assets at the beginning of the year.
Current liabilities represent liabilities that are due within the next business operating cycle
including the current portion of long-term debt. As this debt becomes due, companies may find
it difficult to refinance the debt if they are poorly performing companies thus providing an
incentive to sell assets. INT_COVERAGE is computed by dividing earnings before interest and
taxes by interest payments. Firms paying down debt have a strong incentive to sell assets.
Two performance characteristics, NI and TOBINS_Q, are also included as control
variables. NI is net income scaled by total assets. TOBINS_Q follows Lang et al. (1989) and is
calculated by adding the book value of assets to the difference between the market value of
equity and the book value of equity and dividing the sum by the book value of assets.
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Results
Table 16 presents a summary of the sample observations. There were 18 firms identified as
annual revenue manipulators that sold assets. Two firms had multiple asset sales giving 21
observations of asset sales by a manipulating firm. The average number of years in the
manipulation period for the sample was 1.5 years. The final sample included the periods that are
two years before (if available) and two years after (if available) the manipulation period. This
increases the total firm years in the sample to 144.
Table 16 - Summary of Sample Observations
Firms having asset sales
18
Number of firms with multiple asset sales
2
Number of asset sales by manipulating firms
21
Firm years in manipulation period
27
Average number of years in manipulation period
1.5
Number of firm years in final sample*
144
*Includes data for two years before manipulation period (when available) and two years after
manipulation period (when available).
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Table 17 provides the distribution of the sample by the first year of manipulation. The
revenue manipulation period covered the period from 1988 through 2005, but the firms that sold
assets were found to have had their first year of manipulation during the period from 1996-2003.
Table 17 - Distribution of Sample by First Year of Manipulation
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Firms
2
3
1
3
4
3
1
1
Total

18

Table 18 provides the distribution of the sample by the year of asset sale. Nine of the
firms sold assets in the first year after the manipulation period and five firms sold assets in the
second year after the manipulation. Four firms sold assets during the manipulation period.
Table 18 – Distribution of Sample by Year of Asset Sale
Year
Firms
Two years before manipulation
0
One year before manipulation
3
First year of manipulation
2
Second year of manipulation
2
One year after manipulation
9
Two years after manipulation
5
Total

21
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Table 19 provides the distribution of the asset sale sample by industry. More firms that
sold assets were included in the business services industry (8) than any other industry.
Table 19 - Distribution of Sample by Industry

16
20
28
33
35
36
38
73
79

Industry
Firms
Heavy Construction, Except Building
1
Food and Kindred Products
1
Chemicals and Allied Products
1
Primary Metal Industries
1
Industrial Machinery and Equipment
2
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
2
Instruments and Related Products
1
Business Services
8
Amusement and Recreation Services
1
Total
18

Table 20 presents (untransformed) descriptive statistics for all variables in the logistic
regression model for the full sample of asset selling firms and control firms. Forty-four percent
of the firms sold assets after the manipulation period and 19% sold assets before the
manipulation period. The mean of the debt as a percentage of assets (DEBT) is 55% with a
median of 51%. Net income as a percentage of assets (NI) has a mean of -26% with a median of
3%. Interest coverage (INT_COVERAGE) has a mean of 8.54, a median of 0.00, a minimum of
-2575.40 and a maximum of 1044.66. Tobins Q (TOBINS_Q) has a mean of 2.74, a median of
1.83, a minimum of 0.62, and a maximum of 26.16. Size, the natural log of the market value of
equity (SIZE), has a minimum of 1.07 and a maximum of 12.07 with a mean of 5.93 and a
median of 5.48. Current liabilities as a percentage of assets (CL) have a mean of 28% and a
median of 24%.
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Table 20 - Descriptive Statistics (n = 144)

Variable
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN
DEBT
MANIPULATOR
NI

INT_COVERAGE
TOBINS_Q
SIZE
CL

Mean
0.44
0.19
0.55
0.50
-0.26
8.54
2.74
5.93
0.28

Minimum
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
-11.66
-2575.40
0.62
1.07
0.01

Median
0.00
0.00
0.51
1.00
0.03
0.00
1.83
5.48
0.24

Std.
Maximum Deviation
1.00
0.50
1.00
0.39
3.87
0.41
1.00
0.50
1.15
1.17
1044.66
258.44
26.16
3.10
12.07
2.53
3.41
0.29

Univariate statistics in Table 21 contain means for the firms that received an AAER for
revenue manipulations and sold assets compared to a control sample that did not receive an
AAER for revenue manipulations. Chi-square test statistics indicate significant differences in
frequencies between groups for firms that have asset sales (p < 0.001). T-test statistics indicate
significant differences between the groups for debt (p = 0.011). The test statistics do not show a
significant difference between groups for the other leverage characteristics or the performance
characteristics.
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Table 21 – Univariate Statistics

Mean for
manipulating
firms that sold
assets
Variable
ASSET_SALES
DEBT
NI

INT_COVERAGE
TOBINS_Q
SIZE
CL
Observations

0.28
0.63
-0.31
-16.82
2.92
6.03
0.30
144

ChiSquare/ P-value
t(t- statistic
Mean for
statistic p-value
control sample (bolded) bolded)
0.04
72.04
<0.0001
0..46
-2.562
0.011
-0.22
0.451
0.652
34.62
-1.196
0.234
2.55
-0.718
0.474
5.84
-0.447
0.655
0.27
-0.624
0.534
144

Note: Chi-square tests are performed for dichotomous variables. All others are
t-tests with the results bolded.

Table 22 presents bivariate correlation coefficients for all variables that appear in the
model. Most of the bivariate correlations are low.
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Table 22 - Spearman Correlations (p-values) for Variables in Models (n = 144)
Variable
(1) ASSET_SALES
(2) AFT_MAN
(3) BEF_MAN
(4) DEBT
(5) MANIPULATOR
(6) NI
(7) INT_COVERAGE
(8) TOBINS_Q
(9) SIZE
(10) CL

(1)
1.000
0.131
(0..116)
-0.071
(0.394)
0.234
(0.005)
0.329
(0.000)
-0.049
(0.557)
-0.074
(0.376)
0.193
(0.819)
-0.111
(0.184)
0.015
(0.182)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

1.000
-0.424
(0.000)
0.209
(0.012)
0.002
(0.983)
-0.191
(0.022)
-0.287
(0.000)
-0.026
(0.759)
-0.104
(0.215)
0.102
(0.224)

1.000
-0183
(0.028)
0.011
(.894)
0.107
(0.201)
0.150
(0.072)
0.078
(0.352)
0.046
(0.581)
-0.002
(0.977)

1.000
0.243
(0.003)
-0.194
(0.020)
-0.192
(0.021)
-0.094
(0.258)
-0.086
(0.307)
0.311
(0.000)

1.000
-0.185
(0.026)
-0.035
(0.677)
-0.054
(0.521)
0.029
(0.728)
-0.113
(0.178)

1.000
0.546
(0.000)
0.268
(0.001)
0.375
(0.000)
0.159
(0.056)
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1.000
0.185
(0.026)
0.340
(0.000)
-0.114
(0.173)

1.000
0.198
(0.017)
0.320
(0.000)

1.000
0.090
(0.285)

1.000

(11)

(12)

(13)

Table 23 presents the results of the logistic regressions. In a logistic regression,
parameter signs and p-values are used to determine the effect and strength of the relationship for
independent variables. This sample includes all firm years including the manipulation period, a
period before the manipulation period, and a period after the manipulation period, and there are
144 observations in the sample. Controls, BEF_MAN and AFT_MAN, are included for the
periods before and after the manipulation period. The pseudo R² for the model (.180) indicates a
reasonable amount of variation left unexplained. The variable of interest, MANIPULATOR (p
<.0001) (H1), is significant in this model indicating that the manipulation of revenues is related
to the sale of assets. Other variables, which have been found to be significant in previous
research, are not significant to the model.
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Table 23 - Logistic Regression Results
ASSET_SALES =  +  SIZE +  AFT_MAN +  BEF_MAN +
 MANIPULATOR +  DEBT + BINT_COVERAGE +
 NI +  CL +  TOBINS_Q + 

Variable
Intercept
SIZE
AFT_MAN
BEF_MAN
MANIPULATOR
DEBT
INT_COVERAGE
NI
CL
TOBINS_Q

Expected
Sign
?
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Observations
Pseudo R2
LR Statistic
Prob (LR statistic)

Parameter
Estimate
-2.971
-0.122
0.674
-0.127
2.241
0.998
0.001
0.391
-0.925
-0.006

P-value
0.003
0.264
0.243
0.873
<.0001
0.249
0.877
0.456
0.308
0.943
144
.180
23.34
0.005

Summary and Conclusions
Prior research investigating asset sales has focused on value creation for the buyer and
seller. A popular theory, efficient deployment hypothesis, suggests that asset sales occur in order
to allocate assets to firms that more effectively manage the asset. According to this theory, both
the buyer and seller gain from the transaction. Another theory, the financing hypothesis, states
that managers value firm size and will only sell assets because of a financial event. These events
may include the need to pay down debt, the need to avoid debt covenant restrictions, or the need
to boost cash.
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The current study investigates whether management will be more likely to sell assets
when they fraudulently manipulate revenues. The results show a positive relationship between
asset sales and revenue manipulations. This supports the financing hypothesis theory of asset
sales. While this study is exploratory and provides a beginning for analysis, the findings are
limited by the small sample size. Sample sizes in asset sale research tend to be small. For
example, Lang et al. (1995) had a sample size of 93 and Datta et al. (2003) had a sample size of
113.
Future research could expand the sample by including firms where management has
manipulated the financial statement in other ways in addition to the manipulation of revenues.
Previous research using a sample of AAERs has included all forms of financial statement fraud.
Another limitation of the study is that the model leaves a significant amount of variation
unexplained. Future research can determine other variables that could provide further insight
into the reasons why firms sell assets. Control variables for this study were taken from prior
research, but other variables from research into distressed firms may apply to this study.
To further investigate actions that managers take to divert attention from revenue
manipulations, the sample could be expanded to include revenue manipulating firms that go
through a merger or acquisition during the manipulation period. A merger or acquisition would
possibly hide abnormal cash
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Limited prior research examines characteristics of firms that commit specific types of
fraud, and previous research generally investigates fraud through the use of accruals. This threepaper dissertation explores indicators of firms that fraudulently manipulate revenues by
specifically looking at the relationship between reported revenues and cash flows from
operations as well as reported revenues and discretionary expenditures. Unexpected, significant
asset sales are also investigated as a way for management to divert attention from the fraudulent
manipulation. This study adds to the existing body of literature by separating revenue
manipulations from other types of fraud and by looking at cash flows instead of accruals as an
indicator of fraud.
The first study is an investigation of the relationship between cash flows from operations
and manipulated revenues. Increased cash flows from operations generally result from an
increase in revenues, but this may not occur when revenues are fraudulently recorded. Empirical
results from this study support this theory. During the manipulation period, cash flows from
operations are abnormally low for firms that fraudulently manipulate revenues, but they are not
abnormally low before or after the manipulation period for these firms. Since the sample used in
this study is AAERs, which result from investigations by the SEC and may include larger firms,
the generalizability of the results for smaller entities may be reduced. This study offers a starting
point for developing an understanding of the characteristics of firms that manipulate revenues.
Future research may be used to determine other factors that indicate revenue manipulations.
The second study explores the effect of revenue manipulations on discretionary
expenditures. Since paper one shows that cash flows from operations are abnormally low when
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firms manipulate revenues, managers would be motivated to increase cash flows. One way to
accomplish this would be to decrease discretionary expenditures. Prior research has shown that
firms manage their financial statements through the use of discretionary expenditures. The
results of this paper do not support this theory. Discretionary expenditures are not abnormally
low for firms that manipulate revenues. An alternate theory found in other research is that
discretionary expenditures are difficult to manage in the short term. The results of the current
study may support this alternate theory and can be investigated in future research.
The third paper researches the relationship between asset sales and revenue
manipulations. There are two theories for why managers sell assets. One is that it is for the
good of the company and the assets are sold to a firm that can manage them for higher profit.
The other hypothesis is that managers sell assets when an event, such as poor performance,
occurs that motivates them to sell the assets. This theory states that managers do not want to sell
assets because they value such things as the size of the firm. The results of the current study
support this theory. When a company manipulates revenues, management is more likely to sell
assets. This may be because they want to divert attention from the revenue manipulation. Future
research could include firms that have significant mergers and acquisitions since this activity
would also divert attention from the fraudulent activity and also hide the abnormally low cash
flows.
This dissertation provides insight into revenue manipulation since revenue manipulations
are not generally separated from other types of fraud. It also begins a discussion of the value of
the cash flow statement as an indicator of fraudulent activity. Prior research has generally not
focused on the cash flow statement since the focus has been on accruals manipulations.
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The

dissertation also offers opportunities for future research into other characteristics of revenues
manipulators and how the financial statement can be managed by the use of cash flows.
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